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The courtroom was set up for a lynching, divided by race, the
defendant’s family (all black) on the right, the victim’s family (all
white) on the left. Court-appointed sheriff’s deputies even protect-
ing the victim’s family. People don’t consider us as individuals
anymore, now we are the sisters and brothers of a murderer or a
person who killed a white man. Father stopped taking his insulin
after brother [was] put on death row, and he died a few months
later. My sister was ten years old when it happened. Lost her
brother and father at the same time. Yet our family has stuck to-
gether.
The press wanted to know if we were reared in the projects.
Were we beaten? Were we drug addicts? During the trial, they
treated us like we were all murderers. All of us feel dead, but we
keep on breathing, dreading every day as the possible execution
day.
—Martina Correia believes that her brother, Troy Anthony Davis,
who is on death row in Georgia, is innocent.
I got a fast education in criminal justice. It was my first experi-
ence with anything like this. To the prosecution, the victim’s fam-
ily, we might as well have had the same disease, they wouldn’t
even get on the same elevator with me and my mother and my
daughter. Course they set on one side behind the prosecution, I
sat behind the defense. They treated us like we were dirt. When
the jury came back with the verdict [for the death penalty,] the
judge had warned against any outbursts, but somebody screamed,
like the scream when someone makes a touchdown. I still wake up
nights with the horrible nightmare, hearing that scream.
—Arlene Farris, whose son, Troy Dale Farris, is on death row in
Texas for a murder she claims he did not commit.
Very bad. I mean, it was awful. It was something I wouldn’t
wish on my worst enemy. It was terrible. It was so negative. It
was very clear that they weren’t concerned about details, just the
crime, not how it came about. How did it get from step one to step
ten? They weren’t interested in any of that. There were times
when I felt like I would look in the mirror and ask if I did some-
thing wrong. They made me feel like we had lost our human citi-
zenship, period. Yes everybody, the whole system.
—Pam Crawford, sister of Ed Horseley, Jr., a black man executed
in Alabama for the kidnapping and killing of a fifteen-year-old white
girl.
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We testified at sentencing phase. It was so unnerving you can’t
even imagine. My mind stopped, brain shut down. I was trying to
think, but I was furious. I remember that rage I kept wanting to
scream, “If these people are victims, what are we?” We had to lis-
ten to the supposed victims and listen to why it was so horrible. I
was enraged, that is the main thing I remember. Which was not a
good thing. I wanted to scream at them. This is my son, he didn’t
kill anyone, but you don’t care. You want someone else to suffer.
That was the main thing. I have since got over that.
—Barbara Longworth, whose son, Richard Longworth, was sen-
tenced to death for being an accomplice in the murder of a theater
employee in South Carolina.
My experience with the court system couldn’t have been more
negative. I had always believed that trials were fair and folks
were treated equally, but what I discovered is how political the
system is. It depends a lot on the victims—who they are—and the
defendant’s attorney—how good he is and how much time he puts
in, et cetera—and on the prosecutor’s office—whether or not they
decide to ask for the death penalty—and on and on.
I learned that there is a lot of pressure for judges to give a death
penalty if they want to stay in the system and move up the judi-
cial ladder. I learned that many defense attorneys are marginal at
best. Public defenders and appointed attorneys may be over-
worked or incompetent.
I am appalled at how politicized and flawed the whole thing is.
It turns my stomach to learn what happens to the average defen-
dant and his family who may not have the educational or personal
resources or support that we did to deal with the death penalty.
You almost need to be a legal expert to understand the death pen-
alty process because it is so complicated and multi-layered. Most
people don’t have any idea. And, before this, I was like the general
public and had simplified the whole thing.
—Kathy Norgard, whose son was on death row after killing an
elderly couple in Arizona.1
I.   INTRODUCTION
These are the voices of people who have, or have had, loved ones
on death row in the United States, speaking about their experiences
with the criminal justice system. Today the victims of violent crimes
receive a great deal of political and media attention.2 The “victims’
                                                                                                                      
1. At a new sentencing hearing, Norgard’s son received a life sentence and is no
longer on death row.
2. The term “victim” is used here, as it is in most criminal justice statutes, to include
either the victim of a crime or a family member representing the victim in the case of a
homicide. Most state statutes that allow victim impact evidence in homicide cases interpret
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rights movement” has made incredible strides in reshaping the
criminal justice laws in most states.3 Many positive developments
have come from the victims’ rights movement.4 Allowing victims to
have input into the process can promote healing and help restore a
sense of control over their lives.5 The extent of victim involvement
varies from state to state. Some states allow victims to have input in
each phase of the prosecution of a criminal case, from plea bargain-
ing to sentencing.6 Some states, like Colorado, require that the
prosecution consult with the victim.7
Unfortunately, the expanded rights of victims have come at the
cost of restricted rights for criminal defendants.8 For example, al-
lowing victims to participate in the criminal justice system may in-
ject an element of emotionalism into the process. Defendants may be
unable to get bail when judges listen to the wishes of victims hoping
to keep the defendant incarcerated, and prosecutors may be unwill-
ing to enter into plea agreements because of pressure from victims.
While the authors believe that society has a responsibility to support
and assist victims of crimes in receiving the help they need to heal
from the tragedies they have suffered, the rights of victims must not
come at the loss of defendants’ rights to dignity, fair treatment, and
due process.
One area in which the increase in victims’ rights has had a pro-
found impact is in the use of victim impact statements. Most states
allow victims’ family members to give statements describing the
losses they suffered as a result of violent crime.9 There are many
reasons why the use of victim impact statements should not be al-
lowed in death penalty cases. First, the details of what happened to a
family as a result of the crime and their opinions about what should
happen to a defendant are not legally relevant. When first asked to
                                                                                                                      
the term “victim” in this manner. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:4-a (1996) (providing
rights to the “victim of the offense, or the victim’s next of kin if the victim has died”).
3. See Carrie L. Mulholland, Note, Sentencing Criminals: The Constitutionality of
Victim Impact Statements, 60 MO. L. REV. 731, 734 (1995) (tracing the victims’ rights
movement to the claims of the women’s rights movement that the criminal justice system
mistreated rape victims).
4. For a more detailed description of the evolution of victims’ rights legislation, see
Ashley Paige Dugger, Note, Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing: A History of In-
compatibility, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375 (1996).
5. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Balancing Victim’s Rights and Vigorous Advocacy for the
Defendant, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 135, 141-42 (1990).
6. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
7. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-302.5(1)(e) (1998) (granting victims the right to con-
sult with the prosecution at any time after the defendant is charged, prior to any disposition
of the case, or prior to any trial of the case).
8. See Alice Koskela, Casenote & Comment, Victim’s Rights Amendments: An Irre-
sistible Political Force Transforms the Criminal Justice System, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 157, 158
(1997).
9. See Mulholland, supra note 3, at 732.
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rule on the constitutionality of victim impact statements, the United
States Supreme Court in Booth v. Maryland10 noted:
[D]efendants rarely select their victims based on whether the
murder will have an impact on anyone other than the person
murdered. Allowing the jury to rely on a [victim impact state-
ment] therefore could result in imposing the death sentence be-
cause of factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that
were irrelevant to the decision to kill.11
Second, victim impact statements do not fulfill any of the traditional
sentencing goals of deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation, and
are only marginally relevant in supporting the goal of retribution.12
The use of victim impact evidence sets up a hierarchy of victims.13
It results in the most articulate persons getting the “best” results.
Not surprisingly, the victim’s family members often feel pressure to
speak persuasively in favor of killing the defendant. As Reverend
Bernice King, daughter of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., describes,
this process harms the victim’s family by turning them into killers:
The need for revenge, and the anger that accompanies it, are
sicknesses of the soul that ultimately destroy the one who harbors
them.
. . . .
. . . Not until I learned to love those who killed my relatives did
I begin to heal the anger that was eating away at me inside. Anger
festers, debilitates, cripples and paralyzes.14
Interestingly, for many victims’ family members, the initial zeal
to seek the death penalty often dissipates over time. Reverend King
interviewed many victims’ family members who initially supported
the death penalty but eventually came to oppose it.15 Perhaps this
                                                                                                                      
10. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
11. Id. at 504-05 (footnote omitted).
12. See Dugger, supra note 4, at 399-400.
13. One commentator posits that a victim’s interests are adversely affected by that vic-
tim’s participation at sentencing.
For example, in Texas, before imposing a sentence upon a man convicted of
murdering two men, one judge considered the characteristics of the victims and
refused to impose a life sentence. The judge’s reason for refusing to impose a
stiff sentence was that the victims were homosexuals. However, the judge did
not restrict his disdain to homosexuals; he also stated that he would not sen-
tence a murderer to life imprisonment for killing a prostitute.
Michael Ira Oberlander, Note, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact Statements at Capital
Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1621, 1652 (1992) (citing Lisa Belkin, Texas Judge
Eases Sentence for Killer of Two Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1988, at A8).
14. Bernice King, Cutting the Chain of Violence, ORGANIZING THE RELIGIOUS
COMMUNITY AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: VISION ’98, (American Friends Service Commit-
tee, Philadelphia, Pa.), 1998, at 3.
15. See Bernice A. King, Uprooting the Seeds of Violence, THE OTHER SIDE, Sept.-Dec.
1997, at 34, 36. (describing her process of reconciliation with the people who murdered her
father and grandmother).
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opposition is due to the possibility that if a victim’s family member
were to testify at sentencing or be part of the decision to seek the
death penalty, that person may ultimately regret testifying and may
be left carrying the moral burden of having helped send a person to
death.
Ironically, the focus on victims’ rights overlooks the reality that
the death penalty creates another layer of victims—the family and
friends of the person condemned to death. Strangely absent from the
current dialogue at sentencing is input from the families of those de-
fendants who are facing a possible death sentence. These families
suffer severely, either because they are stigmatized or because they
are invisible in the process. They usually do not have the support of
the community and often suffer “chronic grief.”16 The judge and jury
rarely hear testimony about what has happened to the defendants’
families’ lives as a result of the crime, or what happens when a fam-
ily’s loved one is sentenced to death and ultimately executed.17
In many ways it would be preferable to eliminate the use of victim
impact statements at death penalty sentencing hearings, but that is
unlikely given the current political climate. Politicians use the
“tough on crime” slogan incorporating the death penalty and try to
expedite the death penalty. It would be perceived as political suicide
for politicians to suggest anything that might be interpreted as a loss
of “rights” for victims.18
To balance the influence of victim impact statements, we propose
the use of defendants’ family impact statements during the sentenc-
ing phases of capital trials. Judges and juries in death penalty cases
should be allowed to hear from the family members and friends of
those on trial for their lives. Juries should hear about the impact an
execution will have on the children of the defendant. The jury should
hear what has happened to the defendant’s spouse, mother, brother,
grandchildren, and other loved ones since the defendant was charged
with a capital crime. The system should realize that the innocent
family members of the defendant are also victimized by the process
and that the impact of their loved one’s death sentence on their lives
is significant.
                                                                                                                      
16. Chronic grief is a prolonged grief reaction that does not come to a satisfactory con-
clusion. It is easily diagnosed because the mourner is quite aware that she is not getting
through the period of grief. See J. WILLIAM WORDEN, GRIEF COUNSELING AND GRIEF
THERAPY: A HANDBOOK FOR THE MENTAL HEALTH PRACTITIONER 59 (1982).
17. See infra Part V.A.
18. James Monen, a candidate for the Nebraska Legislature in 1994, described a pro-
posed constitutional amendment providing special rights for crime victims as “silly.”
Brashear voted for the amendment anyway because he “didn’t have the courage to vote
against something called a victim’s rights amendment.” Kermit Brashear Is Well-Qualified,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 29, 1994, at 50.
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We wish to state at the outset that we are unequivocally opposed
to the death penalty. We contend that the death penalty should be
abolished in the United States.19 The death penalty simply does not
work. No evidence supports the proposition that it deters future
crime any more so than does long-term incarceration.20 It is applied
in a capricious and racist manner;21 it is a significant human rights
violation;22 it drains governmental resources;23 and it is killing the
American soul by using violence to solve violence and by purporting
to implement a simple solution to complex problems. However, be-
cause the abolition of the death penalty is anything but imminent,
this Article suggests changes within the system to make the death
penalty process a little more fair.
This Article presents the death penalty sentencing process as it
currently exists in the United States and suggests ways to expand
the process to include the family members of defendants facing the
death penalty. Three legal arguments support introduction of this
evidence. First, defendant family impact evidence reflects on the
character of the defendant. How a defendant’s family members have
been or will be impacted by a death sentence reflects on the defen-
dant’s character and is therefore relevant and admissible. Next, be-
cause judges who impose sentences hear from the victims’ family
                                                                                                                      
19. Rachel King, a former assistant public defender, observed first hand the vagaries
and injustices of the “justice system.” She left her position with the Alaska Public Defender
Agency to work full-time on a campaign to oppose reinstatement of the death penalty in the
state of Alaska. Katherine Norgard’s adopted son was convicted of a capital crime and sen-
tenced to death in the state of Arizona. Her family experienced a veritable nightmare until
his sentence was reversed and a life sentence was imposed. Norgard, a practicing psycholo-
gist and university adjunct professor, was instrumental in founding the Arizona Coalition to
Abolish the Death Penalty. Both authors are active in efforts to abolish the use of the death
penalty throughout the United States.
20. See Jonathan S. Abernethy, The Methodology of Death: Reexamining the Deter-
rence Rationale, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 379, 379 n.4 (1996); Steven G. Gey, Justice
Scalia’s Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 108 & n.185 (1992).
21. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); see
also Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1603,
1605 n.11 (1988) (stating that most studies indicate at least some sentencing disparity based
on the race of the victim); Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administer-
ing the Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519,
520 (1995) (stating that the death penalty is administered in a racially discriminatory man-
ner). But see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-98 (1986) (holding that a study indicat-
ing a disparity in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on the races of the
defendant and the victim was insufficient to show that any decision maker in the case acted
with discriminatory intent).
22. See Michael D. Hintze, Attacking the Death Penalty: Toward a Renewed Strategy
Twenty Years After Furman, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 395, 422 n.149 (1993) (stating
that the abolition of the death penalty has increasingly become the subject of international
human rights agreements).
23. See Stephen B. Bright, The Death Penalty as the Answer to Crime: Costly, Coun-
terproductive and Corrupting, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1211, 1233 (1995) (arguing that the
death penalty actually promotes crime by draining millions of dollars from more promising
efforts to restore safety to society).
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members, they should also hear from the defendants’ family mem-
bers. Lastly, defendant family impact evidence is admitted in many
states in noncapital felony sentencing hearings and should be admis-
sible in capital cases as well.
Policy reasons also support introduction of defendant family im-
pact evidence. First, defendant family impact evidence will human-
ize the defendant so that the jury will have a more balanced under-
standing of the impact of its decision to impose death. Second, the
evidence will humanize the defendant’s family in the eyes of the vic-
tim’s family. If the victim’s family is able to see the defendant as a
person who has a family and people who love him,24 the humaniza-
tion process could begin a healing between the two families and fa-
cilitate reconciliation, restoration, and ultimately healing for all. The
kind of forgiveness that is possible through healing promotes the
sentencing goal of rehabilitation. Third, to the extent punishment is
thought necessary to heal the harm a crime has caused society, this
concrete healing seems more effective than a theory of healing
through punishment.
II.   SURVEY METHOD
For purposes of this Article, the authors interviewed twenty-eight
people.25 Each of these people has a family member who is either
currently awaiting execution, has been executed, or, in one case, was
sentenced to die but, thereafter, was resentenced to life in prison.
The authors used a standard series of questions to elicit the subjects’
experiences within the criminal justice system and to determine how
these experiences affected their lives.26 Some of the questions were
open-ended to allow participants to elaborate on their experiences.
Individuals’ stories provide anecdotal information to supplement this
Article and should not be taken as firm scientific conclusions.
Some general observations can be made from the information. All
but one person has experienced some form of shame or ostracism
from friends, family, or society in general. None of the participants
are currently in favor of the death penalty; although, many were be-
                                                                                                                      
24. We are using “him” instead of a more gender-neutral term for the sake of conven-
ience. Of the 467 people executed between the 1976 reinstatement of capital punishment
and July 1, 1998, only three, or 0.64%, were women. See Memorandum from Tonya D.
McClary, Research Director, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, to the National
Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty National Leadership Summit 3 (Sept. 30, 1998).
Also, of all the defendant family members we interviewed in our survey, only one of the re-
lated defendants was a woman.
25. The authors do not represent this survey as statistically sound because we did not
use a random sample. However, the authors asked each participant the same series of ques-
tions that were developed by the authors. The Article attempts to give voice to the partici-
pants’ experiences within the criminal justice system.
26. See infra Appendix.
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fore their loved one became involved in a capital case. All interview-
ees continue to maintain a relationship with the person on death
row, through either letters or visits. All participants believe that
their loved ones had not received adequate legal representation ini-
tially; although, some now believe that their family member has
competent counsel. Seven survey participants believe that their
loved one is innocent.
Most family members have experienced some type of stress-
related health problem. Two subjects claimed that family members
had died as a direct result of stress-related health problems: one con-
tracted cancer, the other was a severe diabetic who stopped taking
his insulin and died. Many family members have experienced symp-
toms that are typical of depression: three described themselves as
feeling “devastated,” three were treated for depression, some claimed
to be “totally lost” and filled with “despair,” and others suffered
strokes and heart disease.
Many interviewees have experienced a profound loss of faith in
the criminal justice system. They had previously believed in “the sys-
tem,” but now they feel that it is unfair. This is especially difficult for
the family members who believe that their loved ones were wrong-
fully convicted and are innocent.
III.   THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES
A.   Historical Overview of the Death Penalty
We have executed one another since antiquity.27 During antiquity,
violence was face to face, and the entire community was involved ei-
ther as spectators or as executioners in the communal stonings.28
Historically, in both England and the United States, executions were
arranged and carried out as a sort of public ritual for the benefit of
hundreds, even thousands, of spectators.29 This ritual often “began
with the arrival of the condemned person in the custody of the sher-
iff and ended with the corpse being carted off to ignominious burial
in some potter’s field.”30 The last public execution in the United
States took place roughly sixty-two years ago on May 21, 1937.31
Today, most executions are carried out in a semi-private fashion
with the warden in charge of the execution exercising considerable
                                                                                                                      
27. See ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION
PROCESS 4 (1990).
28. See id.
29. See Background and Developments, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 3, 12
(Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982).
30. Id.
31. See id. at 13.
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discretion in deciding who may witness the proceedings.32 Executions
are still conducted in a ritualized manner,33 but “[t]he condemned
prisoner dies in a surgical environment out of view, although it is the
public who ultimately sanctions his death.”34 Some theories on why
executions are no longer public are that they are “grisly and trau-
matic event[s] for viewers” and the government fears that public
executions would fuel the fight against the death penalty by those
traumatized by witnessing the event.35
John D. Bessler has argued that public executions actually in-
creased the incidence of crime by “arous[ing] the bloody instincts” of
the criminally inclined.36 The laws prohibiting public executions
physically removed the public presence from executions and, perhaps
more significantly, completely removed the death penalty from pub-
lic consciousness.37
The earliest recorded lawful execution of a person of European
descent in what would eventually become the United States took
place in 1622 when Daniel Frank was hanged in the Colony of Vir-
ginia.38 Since that time, 18,000 to 20,000 men, women, and children
have been executed in America.39 Today, thirty-eight states use the
death penalty, as do the federal government and the United States
military.
In 1972 the Supreme Court ruled in Furman v. Georgia40 that the
death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.41 The vote was five-to-four,
and each Justice wrote a separate opinion.42 Justice Potter Stewart
compared the irrationality of the death penalty to being struck by
lightning,43 and Justice William O. Douglas observed that its applica-
tion was “pregnant with [racial] discrimination.”44 The immediate re-
sult of Furman was that all prisoners then living under a sentence of
                                                                                                                      
32. See Roderick C. Patrick, Hiding Death, 18 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 117, 118 (1992) (citing Background and Developments, supra note 29, at 14).
33. See id.
34. Id. at 118-19.
35. See id. at 136.
36. JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 29
(1997) (quoting the mid-19th-century anti-death penalty advocate Marvin Bovee).
37. See id. at 78-79 (noting that the passage of laws requiring private executions
helped bring an end to a mid-19th-century movement aimed at abolishing capital punish-
ment by removing gory execution scenes from public view).
38. See Background and Developments, supra note 29, at 3.
39. See id.
40. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
41. See id. at 240.
42. See id. at 239-470. This opinion has the unique distinction of being the longest Su-
preme Court opinion in our judicial history to date.
43. See id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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death had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment.45
In 1976, however, Florida reinstated its death penalty consistent
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Furman. Florida’s statute pro-
vided for guided discretion, specifically listing aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances to guide the judge and jury in their sentencing
decisions.46 The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of
this new system of capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia,47 with
allied cases from Florida and Texas.48 Under these statutes, the
death penalty was no longer considered arbitrary.49 Executions re-
sumed in 1977 when Gary Gilmore was executed in Utah by a firing
squad.50
Capital punishment became a worldwide trend by the 1970s.51 In
his book documenting the historical use of the death penalty, Peter
Linebaugh draws the connection between the growth in capital and
the increase in capital punishment:
The intensification of capital punishment has become a world-
wide trend since . . . capital, reacting to the prior period of colonial
emancipation, unprecedented wage demands and cultural revolu-
tions, gained a new lease on life. Considering five of the countries
that have utilized it most frequently or broadened its application,
we find that South Africa has executed more than a hundred a
year since 1980; that Iran since 1979 has tripled the annual num-
ber of executions, now measured in the thousands; that Nigeria
between 1974 and 1977 extended the death penalty to include
crimes against money; that large numbers have been executed in
China since 1980; and that in the United States, following an un-
official ten-year moratorium, the execution of the death penalty
was resumed in 1977. All told, according to Amnesty Interna-
tional, there have been about a thousand executions a year since
1985, a figure that excludes unofficial deaths that governments
have nevertheless acquiesced in—the “disappeared”, the assassi-
nations, the victims of death squads. Thus, the tendency to capital
                                                                                                                      
45. See Michael L. Radelet, Introduction and Overview, in FACING THE DEATH
PENALTY: ESSAYS ON A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 3, 4 (Michael L. Radelet ed.,
1989).
46. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1977).
47. 428 U.S. 153, 222-26 (1976).
48. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-
60 (1976); see also Background and Developments, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA:
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 3, 16 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997).
49. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259-60.
50. See MIKAL GILMORE, SHOT IN THE HEART 349 (1994). Mikal Gilmore is the brother
of Gary Gilmore. His book is a powerful memoir of their family life and discusses the impact
on his family after Gary’s decision to drop his appeals and “volunteer” to be executed.
51. See PETER LINEBAUGH, THE LONDON HANGED: CRIME AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY at xv (1992).
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punishment has been clear, alarming and specific to a historical
period that has been reactionary in every sense.52
At the same time that capital punishment has been growing in
use, so has opposition to its use. The United Nations has called for
worldwide abolition of capital punishment on the basis that “every
human has an inherent right to life.”53 The American Bar Associa-
tion has called for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty until
jurisdictions implement policies addressing death penalty concerns.54
Canada abolished the death penalty in 1976.55 South Africa abolished
the death penalty in 1995.56 Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Portu-
gal have not allowed capital punishment for decades.57 Britain’s par-
liament has voted several times not to reinstate the death penalty,
which was abolished there in 1965.58
In February 1987 the USSR, as part of glasnost, announced its in-
tention to restrict the death penalty, and a public debate about
the abolition of capital punishment began. The German Demo-
cratic Republic abolished the death penalty on July 17, 1987. In
December 1988 Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, whose father was
hanged in April 1979, commuted over 2,000 death sentences in
Pakistan. In March 1988 Colonel Gaddafi of Libya called for the
abolition of the death penalty, and in June he intervened to com-
mute all existing death sentences.59
Although over eighty countries have abolished the death pen-
alty,60 the United States is not one of them.
B.   Post-Furman Evolution of Death Penalty Jurisprudence
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the death penalty has been any-
thing but consistent. In a series of five death penalty cases decided in
                                                                                                                      
52. Id.
53. See Carol Wekesser, Introduction, in THE DEATH PENALTY: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS
12, 13 (Carol Wekesser ed., 1991).
54. See Joseph J. Roszkowski, ABA Votes on Death Penalty Moratorium, OKs Roger
Williams Law School, R.I. B.J., May 1997, at 23, 23.
55. See Wekesser, supra note 53, at 13.
56. In June 1995, the Constitutional Court ruled that the death penalty for murder
was contrary to South Africa’s interim constitution. On May 8, 1996, the Constitutional As-
sembly adopted a final constitution that retained the wording of the interim constitution
guaranteeing the right to life. See AMNESTY INT’L, THE DEATH PENALTY WORLDWIDE:
DEVELOPMENTS IN 1996 at 2 (June 1997).
57. See Sonia Rosen & Stephen Journey, Abolition of the Death Penalty: An Emerging
Norm of International Law, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 163, 165 (1993) (explaining that
19 states in 1992 ratified an international resolution to abolish the death penalty (citing
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 345 (1993)).
58. See Wekesser, supra note 53, at 13.
59. LINEBAUGH, supra note 51, at xv-xvi n.1 (citing AMNESTY INT’L, WHEN THE STATE
KILLS . . . THE DEATH PENALTY: A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 223 (1989)).
60. See id.
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1976,61 two basic principles emerged that must be considered in
death penalty sentencing: (1) death penalty statutes must provide
individualized sentencing discretion by a jury that may consider any
mitigating evidence; and (2) the jury must be given adequate guid-
ance to identify and evaluate those factors.62 These two principles
have created tension within the jurisprudence, narrowing the discre-
tion of the jury (or judge) to determine who is eligible to receive the
death penalty, while also giving broad discretion to the decision
maker to give mercy and spare the life of the accused.
In Gregg v. Georgia,63 the Georgia Legislature narrowed the class
of persons eligible for the death penalty by specifying ten aggravat-
ing circumstances, one of which must be found before the jury can
consider imposing death.64 The Georgia Legislature also established
a bifurcated trial in which the guilt phase was separate from the de-
termination of the appropriate punishment.65 These two characteris-
tics—bifurcated trial and delineation of particular aggravating fac-
tors—established the prototype for future death penalty statutes.
The individualized sentencing requirement was first articulated
in Woodson v. North Carolina,66 in which the Court held that “in
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the par-
ticular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process
of inflicting the penalty of death.”67 The scope of this right was eluci-
dated two years later in Lockett v. Ohio,68 in which the Court struck
down an Ohio death penalty statute that limited the mitigating fac-
tors a jury could consider in imposing death.69
In 1994, the conflict between the constitutional requirement to
narrow the pool of death eligible defendants and the requirement
                                                                                                                      
61. The five cases known as the 1976 cases are Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
62. See Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Im-
proper Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J.
409, 415-17 (1990).
63. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
64. See id. at 164-65 (citing GA. LAWS ANN. § 27-2503 (Supp. 1975)).
65. See id. at 163-64.
66. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
67. Id. at 304.
68. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
69. See id. at 608. The statute allowed the sentencing judge to consider only the fol-
lowing mitigating factors: (1) whether the victim of the offense induced or facilitated it; (2)
whether it was unlikely that the offense would have been committed but for the fact that
the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation; or (3) whether the offense
was primarily the product of the offender’s psychosis or mental deficiency, though such
condition was insufficient to establish the defense of insanity. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2929.04(B) (Anderson 1975).
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that broad discretion be given to the sentencer in imposing the death
penalty finally proved to be too much for Justice Harry A. Blackmun.
In Callins v. Collins,70 Justice Blackmun, a long time supporter of
the death penalty (at least in his judicial capacity), wrote that con-
fining the sentencer’s discretion in determining death while simul-
taneously giving unlimited discretion to the sentencer to extend
mercy to the defendant, could no longer be reconciled.71 Dissenting to
a denial of a writ of certiorari, Justice Blackmun wrote:
[T]he proper course when faced with irreconcilable constitutional
commands is not to ignore one or the other, nor to pretend that
the dilemma does not exist, but to admit the futility of the effort
to harmonize them. This means accepting the fact that the death
penalty cannot be administered in accord with our Constitution.72
In spite of Blackmun’s pronouncement, the ABA moratorium, the
censure of much of the international community, and the disturbing
vagaries of capital punishment law in the United States, the national
trend is an increasing use of the death penalty. Today all but one of
the death penalty states recognize statutorily specified aggravating
and/or mitigating factors for the jury to use in determining whether
to impose death.73 Most states use a process of weighing aggravating
versus mitigating factors.74 Some states have specific, enumerated
aggravating factors, but not mitigating ones.75 Although most states
use specifically enumerated aggravating factors, Virginia limits the
aggravating factors to “‘future dangerousness’ and ‘vileness.’”76
Texas and Oregon also use slightly different procedures. In these
states the law requires the jury to answer a series of questions re-
garding the culpability and future dangerousness of the defendant.77
                                                                                                                      
70. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
71. See id. at 1155 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1157 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. See TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1999) (listing no aggravating fac-
tors and defining mitigating factors as those “that a juror might regard as reducing the de-
fendant’s moral blameworthiness”).
74. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (1998) (requiring the jury to render an advisory
sentence to the court based on whether mitigating circumstances exist that outweigh any
existing aggravating circumstances).
75. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1998); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1998); KANS. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4625 (1998); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-
1 (Michie 1998).
76. Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 410 S.E.2d 254, 265 (Va. 1991) (construing VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1989)).
77. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b) (1998); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art.
37.071(2)(b), (e) (West 1999). The Oregon statute provides:
Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit
the following issues to the jury:
(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the de-
ceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;
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In Oregon, if the jury unanimously answers “yes” to all the ques-
tions, the court must sentence the defendant to death.78 In Texas, the
court first poses two questions to the jury about the defendant’s cul-
pability and future dangerousness.79 If the jury unanimously an-
swers “yes” to both questions, the jury is then asked a more general
question:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including
the circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s character and
background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant,
there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to
warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death
sentence be imposed.80
With these exceptions, all other states have enumerated aggra-
vating and mitigating factors that the fact finder must consider.
Some states also have a catchall category that allows the fact finder
to consider any other mitigating evidence.81
C.   The Political and Legal Evolution of the Use of Victim Impact
Statements in Capital Cases
On April 23, 1982, President Ronald Reagan established the Task
Force on Victims of Crime to study the experience of victims within
the criminal justice system and to improve their treatment.82 One of
the outgrowths of the victims’ rights movement was the introduction
                                                                                                                      
(B) Whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society;
(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing
the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the de-
ceased; and
(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death sentence.
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b).
The Texas statute provides:
On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the
following issues to the jury:
(1) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(2) in cases in which the jury charge at the guilt or innocence stage permitted
the jury to find the defendant guilty as a party under Sections 7.01 and 7.02,
Penal Code, whether the defendant actually caused the death of the deceased or
did not actually cause the death of the deceased but intended to kill the de-
ceased or another or anticipated that a human life would be taken.
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b) (West 1999).
78. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(f) (1998).
79. See TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b).
80. Id. art. 37.071(2)(e).
81. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(G) (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(1)
(1997); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(h) (West 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6
(Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9) (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1
(Michie 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(a)(iv) (1998).
82. See Exec. Order No. 12,360, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,975 (1982).
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of state and federal legislation seeking to give crime victims more
input into the criminal justice process.83 Some states have compre-
hensive victims’ rights laws that allow victims to have input into the
prosecution’s decision-making process, such as consultation with the
district attorney in decisions about entering into plea agreements or
seeking the death penalty.84 At least twenty-nine states have passed
constitutional amendments that guarantee protection of victims’
rights.85 Proponents of victims’ rights amendments, with some bipar-
tisan support, are hoping to pass a federal constitutional amend-
ment.86
The victims’ rights movement has served to increase the inherent
divisiveness in the criminal justice system. As one commentator
noted, our criminal justice system evolved historically away from a
system that varied the punishment according to the worth of the vic-
tim:
In medieval times, this variance was explicitly acknowledged.
Homicides were avenged by “blood feuds,” and the price to be paid
                                                                                                                      
83. See James M. Dolliver, Victims’ Rights Constitutional Amendment: A Bad Idea
Whose Time Should Not Come, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 87, 88-89 (1987).
84. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4419 (1998) (allowing victims to confer with the prosecu-
tion “about a decision not to proceed with a criminal prosecution, dismissal, plea or sentence
negotiations”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-302.5 (1998) (allowing victims to be present at all
critical stages of the criminal justice process and “to be heard at any court proceeding which
involves a bond reduction or modification, the acceptance of a negotiated plea agreement, or
. . . sentencing”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-91c (1994) (allowing victims “to appear before the
court for the purpose of making a statement for the record” in support of or in opposition to
any plea agreement); IDAHO CODE § 19-5306 (1998) (allowing victims to be “[h]eard, upon
request, at all criminal justice proceedings considering a plea of guilty, sentencing, incar-
ceration, placing on probation or release of the defendant”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7333
(1997) (allowing victims whose personal interests are affected to bring their views or con-
cerns to the attention of the court when appropriate and consistent with criminal law and
procedure); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844 (West 1999) (granting victims the right to retain
counsel to confer with law enforcement and the right to be present at the execution); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-k (1998) (allowing victims to consult with prosecutors regarding
plea bargaining and to offer victim impact statements during sentencing proceedings); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-26-4 (Michie 1998) (allowing victims to confer with the prosecution and to
make a statement to the court at sentencing and at any post-sentencing hearing); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-825 (1997) (requiring that victims receive pretrial notification if the prosecutor
plans to offer a plea bargain); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28C-1 (Michie 1998) (allowing vic-
tims “[t]o offer written input into whether plea bargaining or sentencing bargaining agree-
ments should be entered into”).
85. See Koskela, supra note 8, at 159, 165 (citing ALA. CONST. amend. 557; ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; COLO. CONST. art. II,
§ 16a; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22; ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 8.1; IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15; MD. CONST. art.
XLVII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24; MO. CONST. art. I, § 32; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28; NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 8(2); N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 22; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24; N.C. CONST. art. I, §
37; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10A; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34; OR. CONST. art. I, § 42; R.I. CONST.
art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28; VA.
CONST. art. I, § 8-A; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35; and WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m).
86. See generally S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing a constitutional amend-
ment to protect the rights of crime victims).
1999]                         DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING 1135
by the murderer and his family depended upon the value of the
victim’s life, determined by complex class-based rules. One mur-
der might require the expropriation of assets or even the taking of
several lives. The United States inherited this tradition of varying
punishment with the perceived value of the victim’s life. This
variation of punishment does not disappear in the context of capi-
tal punishment; in fact, it increases.87
Participation in the criminal justice system has been the most
sought after consideration of victims’ rights advocates. However, ac-
cording to some commentators, victim participation is adverse to the
accomplishment of penological purposes.88 On the other hand, one
could make a passionate argument that the capital criminal should
face the damage he has caused through his murdering,89 which may
explain the explosive popularity of victim statements within the last
twenty years.
Because of the severe emotional trauma victims have suffered,
they are usually not the best people to decide what happens in a
criminal case. In her testimony before Congress, Elisabeth A. Semel
warned that a proposed federal victims’ rights amendment would
allow “untrained laypersons suffering emotional trauma . . . to sec-
ond-guess and effectively dictate the policy decisions” of state prose-
cutors.90
Victim impact evidence is difficult to effectively confront. Al-
though the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant the right to
cross-examine victim impact evidence, practically speaking, it is very
difficult to do. A defendant risks alienating the jury by bringing forth
unsavory aspects of the victim or the victim’s family members. Ran-
dall Coyne pointed out that “however appealing this ‘son-of-a-bitch
needed killing’ defense may be in theory, in practice the prospect of a
freshly convicted murderer casting aspersions on his victim would
likely alienate the jury.”91
                                                                                                                      
87. Amy K. Phillips, Note, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of Victim
Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 101 (1997) (footnotes
omitted).
88. See Robert C. Black, Forgotten Penological Purposes: A Critique of Victim Partici-
pation in Sentencing, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 225, 230-37 (1994) (examining traditional justifica-
tions used in making sentencing decisions, such as retribution, rehabilitation, incapacita-
tion, and deterrence, and making compelling arguments as to how participation of victims
in the sentencing process does not fulfill these goals); Dugger, supra note 4, at 398-403 (ar-
guing that victim impact evidence does not advance traditional sentencing goals of retribu-
tion, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).
89. See Dugger, supra note 4, at 400.
90. Proposals for a Constitutional Amendment to Provide Rights for Victims of Crime:
Hearing on H.J. Res. 173 and H.J. Res 174 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 88 (1996) (statement of Elisabeth A. Semel, on behalf of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers).
91. Randall Coyne, Inflicting Payne on Oklahoma: The Use of Victim Impact Evidence
During the Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 589, 595 (1992)).
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These policy concerns were the basis of the Supreme Court’s ini-
tial holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the use of victim
impact evidence.92 In Booth v. Maryland,93 a slim five-to-four major-
ity of the Court struck down the use of such statements on the
grounds that they diverted the jury’s attention away from the defen-
dant and to the victim.94
The Court also noted, as others have, that it is difficult for the de-
fendant to respond to victim impact evidence.95 If the defendant
chooses to attack the character of the victim, it could backfire on
him. The Court pointed out the tactical difficulties capital defen-
dants would face in trying to rebut victim evidence as well as the
risk of having a mini-trial on the victim’s character.96
The following year, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Mann
v. Oklahoma,97 in which the prosecution used photographs of the vic-
tim’s body during sentencing.98 The defense challenged this as a vio-
lation of Booth, reasoning that the photographs could have the same
effect as impermissible victim impact testimony.99 Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Brennan, dissented to the denial of certiorari on the
grounds that this case presented an apparent Booth violation,100 but
three other justices who had been in the Booth majority—Blackmun,
Powell and Stevens—voted to deny certiorari.101
In 1989 the Court heard South Carolina v. Gathers.102 Gathers
and three companions were convicted of raping and murdering a
man in a public park.103 The victim was known to proselytize, and the
prosecution introduced papers that were found on his body, including
a prayer and a voter identification card.104 During the sentencing
phase, the prosecution repeatedly referred to the prayer and the card
as an indication of the victim’s character.105 The Supreme Court of
South Carolina reversed in part and remanded on the grounds that
the “extensive comments to the jury regarding the victim’s character
were unnecessary to an understanding of the circumstances of the
crime.”106 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed; again the vote was five-
                                                                                                                      
92. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508-09 (1987).
93. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
94. See id. at 508-09.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 507.
97. 488 U.S. 877 (1988).
98. See Mann v. State, 749 P.2d 1151, 1156 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
99. See Mann, 488 U.S. at 878 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 877-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.).
101. See id. at 877.
102. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
103. See id. at 806-07.
104. See id. at 807-09.
105. See id. at 808-10.
106. State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988).
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to-four. 107
By 1991 the composition of the Court had changed, and with that
change came a complete turnabout in the law on victim impact evi-
dence. In Payne v. Tennessee,108 the Court skirted the doctrine of
stare decisis and allowed the introduction of victim impact evi-
dence.109 In this case, the impact evidence was the condition of a
young boy left for dead after the defendant stabbed the boy’s mother
and sister to death.110 This time the vote was six-to-three, the major-
ity including Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Souter,
and White, with Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissent-
ing.111 In the four years since Booth, the Court’s jurisprudence had
changed 180 degrees, drastically impacting the fates of death penalty
defendants.
Justice Rehnquist expressed the rationale of the Court:
The States remain free, in capital cases, as well as others, to de-
vise new procedures and new remedies to meet felt needs. Victim
impact evidence is simply another form or method of informing
the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the
crime in question, evidence of a general type long considered by
sentencing authorities. We think the Booth Court was wrong in
stating that this kind of evidence leads to the arbitrary imposition
of the death penalty. In the majority of cases, and in this case, vic-
tim impact evidence serves entirely legitimate purposes. . . .
We are now of the view that a State may properly conclude that
for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpabil-
ity and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentenc-
ing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant.
“[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the miti-
gating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by re-
minding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be con-
sidered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose
death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his
family.”112
At least thirty-two states have begun using victim impact state-
ments in their capital sentencing proceedings since Payne.113 Five
                                                                                                                      
107. See Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812.
108. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
109. See id. at 827-28.
110. See id. at 814-16.
111. See id. at 810.
112. Id. at 824-25 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987) (White, J., dis-
senting)).
113. See Phillips, supra note 87, at 99-100. The 32 states that use victim impact evi-
dence are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. See id.
at 100 n.56.
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states have statutes that appear to contain inconsistencies or ambi-
guities, with the further disadvantage that interpretive case law is
thus far absent.114 For example, in New Hampshire, one statute al-
lows victim impact evidence to be presented in capital cases specifi-
cally to the sentencing judge,115 while another statute delegates capi-
tal sentencing exclusively to juries.116 Only Indiana specifically ex-
cludes victim impact evidence from death penalty hearings, and even
that exclusion is limited to situations in which the evidence is not
relevant to the Indiana death penalty statute’s aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.117
D.   The Impact of the Death Penalty on the Defendant’s Family
1.   Stigmatization
The results of our interviews show that defendants’ families suf-
fer serious social stigmatization. Martina Correia described the as-
sault on her self-esteem and her loss of identity in these words: “Peo-
ple don’t consider us [my family] as individuals anymore. . . . The
press wanted to know if we were reared in the projects. Were we
beaten? Were we drug addicts? During the trial, they treated us like
we were all murderers.”118
Defendants’ family members lose their individual identities when
society views them only as the relatives of murderers. They often feel
that they have been found guilty by association. They may lose self-
esteem and actually begin to wonder whether they have done some-
thing wrong.
The seating arrangements in courtrooms exacerbate this prob-
lem—defendant’s family on one side, victim’s family on the other.  A
law enforcement officer may be assigned to protect the victim’s fam-
ily, leaving the impression that the presence of the defendant’s fam-
ily makes the courtroom a dangerous place.  Any contact between the
families of the defendant and the victim is generally quite hostile.
Stigmatization occurs because the resources offered by the state
are concentrated on the victim’s family members to the exclusion of
the family members of the accused. Murder victims’ family members
recounted some of the services offered them during the criminal pro-
cess. For example, Sue Norton’s family members attended the trial
                                                                                                                      
114. These states are Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, and Wyo-
ming. See id.
115. See id. (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:4-a (1998)).
116. See id. (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(V) (1998)).
117. See id.; see also Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 956-57 (Ind. 1994).
118. Interview with Martina Correia (Dec. 7, 1997) (interview notes on file with Rachel
King).
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at the expense of the state.119 Sally Senior and her daughter received
psychotherapy at a cost of $50,000 each, paid for by the State of Cali-
fornia.120 Kathy Dillon, whose father, a police officer, was murdered,
attends an annual conference at public expense held to support and
honor the family members of police officers killed in the line of
duty.121 In contrast, none of the defendants’ family members received
any type of support or services from the state.
During the sentencing phase of capital trials, the victims’ family
members are permitted to testify about the impact of the crime on
their lives while the defendants’ family members sit in the court-
room, prevented from speaking about the impact the prosecution of
their loved one has on them. The defendants’ family members are
limited to offering explanations of childhood traumas that might ex-
plain why the defendant committed the crime. Recounting these
problems often places the defendants’ families in situations where
they feel responsible for having caused the defendants’ violence. The
combination of these factors, whether intentional or not, excludes the
defendants’ families. The exclusion of defendants’ families also leads
third parties to observe that the criminal justice system views the
victims’ families as good—they get positive attention—and the de-
fendants’ families as bad.
2.   Social Isolation
A death sentence creates a new category of spiritual, emotional,
and psychological distress. There are no support groups for family
members of those condemned to die. Given that there are approxi-
mately 20,000 homicides in any given year in the United States,122
and that, since the mid-1990s, only about 300 of those convicted for
these crimes are sentenced to death,123 family members of these
criminals are small in number and are spread across the thirty-eight
states that currently impose the death penalty as well as the twelve
that do not. California has the most individuals on death row,124 but
                                                                                                                      
119. Interview with Sue Norton (Oct. 13, 1997) (interview notes on file with Rachel
King).
120. Interview with Sally Senior (Sep. 2, 1997) (interview notes on file with Rachel
King).
121. Interview with Kathy Dillon (Oct. 1, 1997) (interview notes on file with Rachel
King).
122. See Taylor Young Hong, Book Review, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 787, 789
(1998) (reviewing JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN
AMERICA (1997)).
123. See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE CASE AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 6 (3d ed. 1998).
124. See Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Death Penalty Information—
California, (visited Mar. 23, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/california.html>.
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Texas has executed the most people—171 since 1976.125 However, no
state-provided treatment options exist for families of the condemned.
Further, the sentencing courts provide no support options, nor do
prisons, victims’ programs, or social service agencies. Moreover,
family members of those sentenced to death typically find one an-
other only if they meet by chance while visiting their loved one on
death row.
Cecilia McWee has met a number of other family members while
visiting her son on death row. Ms. McWee lives in Atlanta, Georgia,
and travels weekly to visit her son in South Carolina. The only sup-
port group Ms. McWee could find was located in Georgia and was or-
ganized for families who have an incarcerated relative. “He commit-
ted the crime in 1991, and I found the support group in 1995.”126 In-
terviews conducted for this Article revealed that death row family
members found their primary support in their extended families and
occasionally in their churches. Support for the family members of the
condemned is in short supply.
Family members of the condemned do not speak of the unspeak-
able. When a friend, a new acquaintance, or another parent casually
asks the death row family member for details of her family, such as
where they live or what they do, a death row mother is left in a pain-
fully awkward situation. Should she respond, “Oh, my son lives in
prison and is under a death sentence. We are waiting for his execu-
tion?” If there were a contest for conversation stoppers, such a reply
would win the award. Instead, family members often isolate them-
selves, cloaking themselves in shame and living with the stigma that
has been cast not only on their loved one, but on the family as well.
Family members are innocent. They have committed no crime,
and there should be no stigma in continuing to find value in and love
for their condemned family member. Family members who choose to
stand by their condemned relative are relegated to silence, usually
feeling powerless to stop the machinery of death that operates to kill
their loved one. Their powerlessness starts at the trial level, where
most of them are ignored and unheard in the guilt or sentencing
phase of the trial.
                                                                                                                      
125. See Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions by State Since 1976,
(visited Mar. 23, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpicreg.html>.
126. Interview with Cecelia McWee (Dec. 7, 1997) (interview notes on file with Rachel
King).
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3.   Depression and Chronic Grief
(a)   Depression
The majority of the family members interviewed in this project
used the words “I was devastated” or “I was in a state of despair” to
describe their feelings after their loved one was sentenced to death.
Three people said they were treated for depression following the sen-
tencing of their relative.
One survey participant expressed her feelings this way: “I had no
belief in anything. The anger continued to grow for a good many
years. I experimented with alcohol, drugs to suppress the feelings
and depression which wreaked havoc in my soul. Nothing could
change the hopeless outlook I had on life. I cut my wrists.”127
Depression is more than the occasional sadness that each of us oc-
casionally feels. It is a debilitating illness that visits people in vary-
ing ways.128 Depression tends to be a chronic recurring illness, and
although a particular episode may be treatable, most sufferers will
experience episodes throughout their lives.129 The American Psychi-
atric Association reports that 80 to 90 percent of patients with de-
pression can be treated effectively.130 The common treatments for de-
pression are psychotherapy, medication, or a combination of the
two.131
(b)   Chronic Grief
The injury suffered when a family member is condemned to die
may well be beyond repair and can develop into a state of chronic
grief unless or until the sentence is overturned.
We contend that despair, devastation, and depression brought
about by the death penalty lead to a condition we call “chronic grief.”
Theories exist about how universal grief “goes wrong,”132 about “de-
layed grief reactions,”133 and “exaggerated grief reactions.”134 The
concept of “chronic sorrow” has long been recognized as a condition
                                                                                                                      
127. Interview with Trevor Dicks (Aug. 28, 1997) (interview notes on file with Rachel
King).
128. See Liora Nordberg, Dealing with the Depths of Depression, FDA CONSUMER, July-
Aug. 1998, at 26, 27.
129. See id. at 28.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 28-29. The Food and Drug Administration has approved several medica-
tions that it finds effective in treating depression. See id. at 27-28.
132. WORDEN, supra note 16, at 58.
133. Id. at 59.
134. Id. at 60. Such reactions are prolonged, excessive in duration, and never perma-
nently cease. See id.
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experienced by parents of the mentally challenged.135 Following an
initial period of grieving, there are recurring occasions of intense
grief associated with a variety of developmental milestones and cri-
ses.136 These episodes are cyclical, intense, and apparently very
common.137 The following reactions have also been identified as
common for these same parents: loss of self-esteem; shame and social
withdrawal in anticipation of social rejection; ambivalent feelings
toward the child to a greater extent than is normally felt by parents;
defensiveness and hypersensitivity to criticism; and other destruc-
tive feelings related to both individual and family functioning.138
We found no books or articles on the library shelves to aid us in
understanding the chronic grief of family members of the con-
demned. These families must attempt to peel away the stigma; in-
crease their diminished self-esteem; emerge from the chaos, despair,
and devastation; and push back the emerging and ever-present
chronic grief they deal with every day of their lives. They must do
this alone, without assistance from the literature and, for the most
part, from the community. “Chronic grief” is a construct created for
and experienced by the families of those condemned to die in our
execution chambers across the country.
Parents of children with chronic illnesses come close to sharing
the same feelings that are described by family members interviewed
for this project. They feel uncertain about the future, identify with
the illness and the sick role, sometimes take negative risks, feel dif-
ferent from others, and have independence/dependence conflicts.139
However, parents of a child with a chronic illness, although waiting
and preparing for the death of their child, are not awaiting the homi-
cide of their child to be committed by the state in the name of the
community.
The death penalty creates another layer of victims. Defendants’
family members not only have to live with the reality of the crime
their loved one committed, but are rendered powerless and speech-
less within the very justice system that was created to defend their
rights and to protect their person. Those who believe their family
member is innocent, or wrongfully convicted of a capital crime, suffer
the burden of feeling powerless to save their loved one from a cruel
                                                                                                                      
135. Lynn Wikler et al., Chronic Sorrow Revisited: Parent vs. Professional Depiction of
the Adjustment of Parents of Mentally Retarded Children, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 63,
64 (1981).
136. See id.
137. See id. at 64-70.
138. See Margaret A. Steinberg, A Message to Special Education from Mothers of Dis-
abled Children, THE EXCEPTIONAL CHILD, Nov. 1980, at 177, 177-78.
139. See ILENE MOROF LUBKIN, CHRONIC ILLNESS: IMPACT AND INTERVENTIONS 9
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and unjust fate.
IV.   LEGAL PRECEDENT IN SUPPORT OF ADMITTING DEFENDANT
FAMILY IMPACT EVIDENCE AS A MITIGATING FACTOR IN CAPITAL CASES
A.   Mitigating Evidence: What the Eighth Amendment Requires
After reinstitution of the death penalty, the first case to consider
the scope and breadth of mitigating evidence was Lockett v. Ohio.140
Lockett was convicted of felony murder as an accomplice to the rob-
bery of a pawnshop during which the owner was killed.141 Lockett
was not present at the store during the robbery and was offered a se-
ries of plea agreements by the prosecution that would have reduced
her charge from a capital murder offense.142 Lockett refused all offers
and took her chances at trial.143 She was convicted and sentenced to
death.144 At sentencing, Lockett submitted evidence from a psycholo-
gist who stated that she had a favorable prognosis for rehabilitation:
she was only twenty-one years old at the time of the offense and had
committed no other major offenses.145 After reviewing the report of
the psychologist and hearing argument on the issue of sentencing,
the court concluded that because none of the statutory mitigating
factors were satisfied, it was obligated to impose the death penalty.146
Under Ohio law, as it existed in 1978, once the jury convicted
Lockett of aggravated murder based on at least one of seven aggra-
vating circumstances, the sentencing judge was required to impose
the death penalty unless one of the following three mitigating factors
was established:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated [the offense].
(2) It [was] unlikely that the offense would have been committed,
but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or
strong provocation.
                                                                                                                      
140. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
141. See id. at 589-90.
142. See id. at 590-92. The best offer was made two weeks before trial when the “prose-
cutor offered to permit her to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter and aggravated rob-
bery (offenses which each carried a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment . . . ).” Id. at
591.
143. See id. at 590-92.
144. See id. 593-94.
145. See id. at 594.
146. See id.
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(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender’s psycho-
sis or mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to
establish the defense of insanity.147
In overturning Lockett’s sentence, the Supreme Court held that
Ohio’s statute violated the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion because it unduly limited the range of mitigating factors a jury
could consider.148 The Court noted that the Ohio statute prevented
the jury from considering the defendant’s age or her minor role in
the offense as mitigating factors.149 Further, the statute mandated
that the lack of proof of the defendant’s criminal intent could be con-
sidered mitigating only to the extent it implicated one of the three
listed mitigating factors.150
In deciding Lockett, the Court admitted that its opinion in Fur-
man had “engendered confusion as to what was required in order to
impose the death penalty in accord with the Eighth Amendment.”151
The Court recalled that in Furman three justices had believed that
even though the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional, al-
lowing juries sentencing discretion without legislative guidance vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment.152 This was so, the three opined, be-
cause such discretionary sentencing was “‘pregnant with discrimina-
tion,’ . . . because it permitted the death penalty to be ‘wantonly’ and
‘freakishly’ imposed, . . . and because it imposed the death penalty
with ‘great infrequency’ and afforded ‘no meaningful basis for distin-
guishing the few cases in which it [was] imposed from the many
cases in which it [was] not.’”153
In Woodson v. North Carolina,154 the Court held that a mandatory
death sentence was unconstitutional.155 Thus, the Court forced states
to provide enough specific guidance to meet the requirements of
Furman without imposing a mandatory structure that would violate
Woodson. The Court, in Lockett, stated explicitly that the Eighth
Amendment requires individualized sentencing in death penalty
cases:
[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments re-
quire that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case,
                                                                                                                      
147. Id. at 607 (citation omitted). As the law is presently written, there are seven miti-
gating factors to be considered. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Anderson Supp.
1997).
148. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 599.
152. See id.
153. Id. (citations omitted).
154. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
155. See id. at 304-05.
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not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any as-
pect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death. We recognize that, in noncapital cases,
the established practice of individualized sentences rests not on
constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted into stat-
utes. The considerations that account for the wide acceptance of
individualization of sentences in noncapital cases surely cannot be
thought less important in capital cases. Given that the imposition
of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all
other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individu-
alized decision is essential in capital cases. The need for treating
each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due
the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in
noncapital cases. A variety of flexible techniques—probation, pa-
role, work furloughs, to name a few—and various postconviction
remedies may be available to modify an initial sentence of con-
finement in noncapital cases. The nonavailability of corrective or
modifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sen-
tence underscores the need for individualized consideration as a
constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.156
Any state statute “that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases
from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defen-
dant’s character and record and to circumstances of the offense prof-
fered in mitigation” creates an unacceptable risk that a sentence less
than death would not properly be considered and, thus, violates the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.157
In Eddings v. Oklahoma,158 the Court had an opportunity to put
Lockett to the test. This case involved a sixteen-year-old defendant
who was convicted of killing a police officer.159 At his sentencing
hearing, Eddings offered evidence of his troubled childhood, includ-
ing the fact that his parents had divorced when he was five years old,
leaving him to live a life without discipline.160 In addition, Eddings’
mother, rumored to be a prostitute, let the boy run wild, and when
she could no longer control him, she sent him to live with his father,
who used physical abuse to discipline him.161 Further evidence
showed that Eddings’ mental and emotional development lagged sev-
eral years behind his age.162
In imposing a sentence of death, the trial court found three ag-
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158. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
159. See id. at 105-06.
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gravating factors and one mitigating factor, Eddings’ youth.163 The
court stated that it was deeply moved by the evidence of the defen-
dant’s family history but believed that it was not legally allowed to
consider it.164 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority con-
cluded that the sentencing judge had improperly limited considera-
tion of mitigating factors.165 The Court stated that the sentencing
judge erred by considering only the evidence that would support a
legal excuse from criminal liability instead of considering “any rele-
vant mitigating evidence,”166 which the majority held was the stan-
dard under Lockett:
By requiring that the sentencer be permitted to focus “on the
characteristics of the person who committed the crime,” the rule
in Lockett recognizes that “justice . . . requires . . . that there be
taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with
the character and propensities of the offender.” By holding that
the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any
relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a
consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false
consistency.167
Justice O’Connor interpreted Lockett’s requirements even more
broadly. In her concurring opinion, she explained why the lower
court should be reversed: “Lockett . . . requires the trial court to con-
sider and weigh all of the mitigating evidence concerning the peti-
tioner’s family background and personal history.”168
Almost a decade after Eddings, the Court returned to the ques-
tion of individualized sentencing in Penry v. Lynaugh.169 Johnny
Paul Penry, a mentally disabled young man, was convicted and sen-
tenced to death for the rape and stabbing death of Pamela Carpen-
ter.170 There was undisputed evidence that Penry had a low IQ.171
Expert testimony established that he had the mental age and abili-
ties of a six and one-half year old and that he suffered from organic
brain damage that left him unable to conform his conduct to the
law.172 The trial court refused to give an instruction specifying that
the jury could consider the evidence of Penry’s low IQ and brain
                                                                                                                      
163. See id. at 108-09.
164. See id. at 109.
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damage as mitigating evidence.173 The Supreme Court reversed
Penry’s death sentence on the ground that the jury had not been al-
lowed to consider the “defendant’s character or record or the circum-
stances of the offense.”174 This catch phrase has become the test by
which subsequent courts have determined whether death penalty
statutes provide sufficient opportunity for the defendant to present
mitigating evidence.
Lockett, Eddings, and Penry provide the constitutional basis for
admitting defendant’s family impact evidence. Interpreted literally,
these cases stand for the idea that any relevant evidence in support
of mitigation is constitutionally required. What is relevant? In the
capital sentencing context, it should be any evidence relative to the
defendant’s character or record or any circumstance of the offense
that the defendant proffers as the basis for a sentence less than
death.175 Evidence of childhood deprivation is always considered
relevant as mitigating evidence; why not evidence that the defen-
dant’s daughter will be deprived of a crucial bond necessary for her
development if her daddy is killed by the state? If the idea behind
mitigation evidence is to allow the jury to get a complete picture of
the defendant, surely the way that he has impacted the people in his
life is a relevant consideration to whether he deserves to live or die.
B.   Legal Precedent from State Courts
Under Lockett, the Court established the principle that any rele-
vant mitigating evidence should be considered at the sentencing
phase of a capital trial.176 However, the use of the defendant’s family
impact evidence as relevant mitigating evidence has not been exten-
sively litigated. What follows is the limited jurisprudence to date.
1.   Oregon
In State v. Stevens,177 the Oregon Supreme Court reversed a death
penalty because the trial court had refused to admit evidence that
executing the defendant would adversely affect his daughter.178 The
trial court ruled that such evidence could not be categorized as miti-
gating within Oregon’s statutory framework.179 The Oregon Supreme
Court overruled, holding that such evidence should have been prop-
                                                                                                                      
173. See id. at 320.
174. Id. at 328.
175. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
176. See id. at 609.
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178. See id. at 162-63, 168.
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erly admitted as a mitigating factor.180
Oregon’s death penalty statute is similar to that of Texas in that
the jury must unanimously answer “yes” to a series of questions be-
fore imposing a death sentence.181 At issue in Stevens was the scope
of the fourth general question and the extent to which mitigating
evidence could be admitted under it. The questions were:
(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death
of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reason-
able expectation that death of the deceased or another would re-
sult;
(B) Whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing threat to society;
(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defen-
dant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the
provocation, if any, by the deceased; and
(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death sentence.182
The Oregon statute further provided that in determining the issue in
the fourth question:
[T]he court shall instruct the jury to answer the question “no” if
one or more of the jurors find there is any aspect of the defen-
dant’s character or background, or any circumstances of the of-
fense, that one or more of the jurors believe would justify a sen-
tence less than death.183
The Stevens court examined the legislative history of Oregon’s
death penalty statute184 and determined that the fourth general
question was intended to be read broadly so as to comply with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Penry.185 The Oregon Supreme Court
concluded that the purpose of the fourth general question was to al-
low a broad range of mitigating evidence to be presented to the fact
finder:
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While the witness’s testimony may not offer any direct evidence
about [the] defendant’s character or background, it does offer cir-
cumstantial evidence. A rational juror could infer from the wit-
ness’s testimony that she believed that her daughter would be af-
fected adversely by [the] defendant’s execution because of some-
thing positive about his relationship with his daughter and be-
cause of something positive about [the] defendant’s character or
background. Put differently, a rational juror could infer that there
are positive aspects about [the] defendant’s relationship with his
daughter that demonstrate that [the] defendant has the capacity
to be of emotional value to others. In that inference, a juror could
find an aspect of [the] defendant’s character or background that
could justify a sentence of less than death.186
The Oregon Supreme Court held that the defendant’s family im-
pact evidence was relevant to the fourth statutory mitigating fac-
tor,187 which dealt with “the defendant’s character or background, or
any circumstances of the offense.”188 The court’s statute-based deci-
sion to allow the introduction of the testimony about the impact of
the defendant’s execution on his daughter is consistent with the Su-
preme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which permits a
broad variety of mitigating evidence to be presented on behalf of the
defendant.
Surely the language from Lockett and Eddings is broad enough to
permit defendant family impact evidence. At issue in Lockett was the
fact that the jury had not been permitted to hear evidence about the
defendant’s character, prior record, age, lack of specific intent to
cause death, and her relatively minor role in the crime.189 What if
Lockett had also been a mother? Why should the jury not have heard
about her life as a mother and how difficult it would have been for
her children if she were executed? As the Eddings Court stated, “By
holding that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to con-
sider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes
that a consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a
false consistency.”190
The evidence at issue in Eddings was the defendant’s family his-
tory and the fact that the defendant had suffered from severe psy-
chological and emotional disorders.191 Who better to testify about
psychological and emotional disorders than the defendant’s family?
Why not also let the jury hear about the impact of the crime on the
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defendant’s family and what will happen to them if their
child/sibling/parent is executed? What we are suggesting is not far-
fetched; a person’s character should be measured, at least in part, by
how that person’s death will affect his family.
By deciding the case on the basis of state law, the Oregon court in
Stevens avoided a potential reversal on federal grounds.192 However,
the Oregon Supreme Court’s holding used the exact language of
Lockett in ruling that evidence of the impact on the defendant’s
daughter was an aspect of the defendant’s character, prior record,
and the circumstances of his offense.193
2.   California
Without deciding questions of relevance, the California Supreme
Court has permitted the introduction of the defendant’s family im-
pact evidence. In People v. Fierro,194 the defendant, David Fierro, ap-
pealed his conviction on a robbery and murder charge.195 At the sen-
tencing hearing, six family members were permitted to testify about
Fierro’s participation in Little League and school plays and about his
loving relationships with his siblings, wife, and children.196 During
summation, defense counsel tried to elicit sympathy for the defen-
dant’s family by arguing the following:
[The] defendant’s family was “just as innocent as the Allessies
[murder victim’s family]” and that contrary to the prosecutor’s as-
sertion, “you do have a right to consider the consequences that
this will have on all the innocent victims.” Defense counsel re-
ferred repeatedly to defendant’s family, observing: “[H]e’s still a
human being. He’s still the father of three lovely children. He still
has a wife. . . . He has a family that love [sic] him and he loves
them. He has children who know him as their father. And I’m sure
that he will always be their father.” In concluding, counsel re-
turned to the theme of family, stating: “And I think that his fam-
ily does need him and his children do need him.”197
However, the prosecutor countered this appeal by arguing that “the
only relevant consideration was ‘sympathy for the defendant,’ ‘not
sympathy for Mrs. Fierro, his mother, not sympathy for his children
or his aunt, but sympathy for the defendant.’”198
One of Fierro’s grounds for appeal was that the prosecutor’s com-
ments during closing argument had improperly influenced the jury
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to disregard the defendant’s family impact evidence.199 Specifically,
Fierro took exception to the prosecutor’s statement that the jury was
supposed to consider sympathy only for the defendant and not for his
family.200 Without specifically ruling on whether the defendant’s
family impact evidence was relevant, the California Supreme Court
denied the claim.201 The court pointed out that the jury had been in-
structed to consider “any sympathetic or other aspect of the defen-
dant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a
sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for
which he is on trial.”202 Contrary to the defendant’s assertions, the
court found that the prosecutor’s remarks had not prejudiced the de-
fendant, holding that the jury had been specifically instructed to
consider family impact evidence.203
Fierro is not a precedent-setting case like Stevens. First, the de-
fense attorney did not introduce actual impact evidence, such as evi-
dence of psychological damage to the defendant’s children if their fa-
ther were to be executed. The attorney merely made the argument
that the defendant’s children might be harmed if he were to be exe-
cuted. Second, the court did not directly decide whether this type of
mitigation evidence was relevant. However, the defense was permit-
ted to introduce evidence and argue that the jury should consider
how an execution would impact the defendant’s family.204
3.   Arizona
In State v. Day,205 the trial judge considered a type of family im-
pact evidence in sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment in-
stead of death.206 The court found a nonstatutory mitigating factor in
the testimony that “the Defendant has the love and support of his
family.”207 This order was not published and gave no specific details
about the types of evidence upon which the judge relied in making
his ruling. Although not precisely defendant family impact evidence,
the consideration of the love and support of the defendant’s family is
a broad interpretation of the Lockett holding.
                                                                                                                      
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 1338.
202. Id. at 1338 (quoting the trial court’s jury instructions).
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. No. CR-20265 (Super. Ct. Ariz. Jul. 15, 1996).
206. See id. at 3-4.
207. Id. at 3.
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4.   One Family’s Experience
Coauthor Kathy Norgard and her family have firsthand experi-
ence with the death penalty and the use of defendant family impact
evidence. Norgard’s adopted son, John Patrick Eastlack, was con-
victed of a double homicide and sentenced to death. Very little miti-
gating evidence was presented at the first sentencing hearing. After
securing new counsel, the family was able to obtain a sentencing re-
hearing on the grounds that substantial mitigating evidence existed
that should have been admitted. For example, the court should have
considered that, as an infant, Eastlack suffered from fetal alcohol
syndrome. It should also have considered that, during the first four
years of his life, Eastlack had been moved among so many foster
placements that he had been unable to form any emotional attach-
ments.
At the sentencing rehearing Norgard, her husband, and her
daughter all testified about how the murders and convictions af-
fected their lives and how emotionally devastating it was to have a
family member on death row. The judge ruled that he would not con-
sider this testimony about the impact on their lives as a nonstatutory
mitigating factor. However, upon resentencing, Eastlack received
the lesser sentence of life. Even though the defendant’s family im-
pact evidence did not directly impact the outcome of the case, it was
important and healing for Norgard and her family to speak about
their experiences and to express the devastation they felt by what
their family member had done and by what society was contemplat-
ing doing to him.
Providing support to the defendant’s family is not a traditional
sentencing goal, but then again, neither is providing support to the
victim’s family. Given the negative feelings that many people have
towards the criminal justice system, satisfying the participants of
the criminal justice system is a positive policy goal.
C.   Defendant Family Impact Evidence Is Relevant and Admissible
in Noncapital Sentencing Hearings
In recent years, the general trend has been to eliminate or reduce
judicial discretion in sentencing.208 Most states have passed determi-
nate sentencing statutes designed to achieve this goal.209
A comparison of the noncapital sentencing statutes with the death
sentencing statutes in death penalty states reveals some interesting
dichotomies. Many death penalty states have mitigating factors in
                                                                                                                      
208. See Christopher M. Alexander, Note, Indeterminate Sentencing: An Analysis of
Sentencing in America, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1720 (1997).
209. See id.
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their noncapital penalty sentencing statutes that explicitly permit
the judge to consider the impact of incarceration on the defendant’s
family before making a decision about sentencing. For example, Illi-
nois has a mitigating factor that allows the judge to consider
whether imprisonment would entail excessive hardship to depend-
ents.210 Illinois courts have broadly interpreted this provision beyond
consideration of only economic factors.211
Indiana has a mitigating factor similar to the Illinois statute that
allows the judge to consider whether prison would result in undue
hardship to the person or dependents of the person.212 Montana al-
lows the sentencer to consider whether “imprisonment of the of-
fender would create an excessive hardship on the offender or the of-
fender’s family.”213
New Jersey law allows the sentencer to consider whether “[t]he
imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to
himself or his dependents.”214 The New Jersey Supreme Court and
lower appellate courts have interpreted this provision broadly, al-
lowing a sentencing court to consider that the defendant had a close
relationship with someone who was dependent on him, such as a
quadriplegic,215 or that the defendant was a mother of two children.216
North Carolina has an interesting provision that allows the court
to consider whether or not the defendant provides support to his
family. If he does, that fact is considered a mitigating factor, if he
does not, the court may consider it an aggravating factor.217 Under
North Carolina law, the judge may also consider whether the defen-
                                                                                                                      
210. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/5-5-3.1(11) (1997).
211. See People v. Young, 619 N.E.2d 851, 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (noting that the trial
court permitted the defendant’s wife to testify that her husband was a caretaker for her two
children and that her son was upset about the possibility of the defendant returning to
prison); People v. Tarala, 505 N.E.2d 1284, 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (admitting evidence
showing that the defendant had provided emotional support to a friend’s children by “acting
like a father” after she and her husband had separated).
212. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-38-1-7.1(c)(10) (1997); see also Battles v. State, 688 N.E.2d
1230, 1237 (Ind. 1997) (noting that “[d]ependent children are properly considered a miti-
gating factor under [Indiana law]”); Geralds v. State, 647 N.E.2d 369, 375 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995) (permitting the defendant’s daughter and her psychologist to testify about the impact
on the daughter of the defendant’s return to prison and the defendant’s ability to function
well with a probationary sentence).
213. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-225(10) (1997). Note that this provision is a considera-
tion in the sentencing of nonviolent offenders. We were unable to locate any published
opinions involving this provision except in the context of financial hardship.
214. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(b)(11) (West 1998).
215. See State v. Johnson, 570 A.2d 395, 400 (N.J. 1990).
216. See State v. Mirakaj, 632 A.2d 850, 851 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
217. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A-1340.16(e)(17) (1997) (mitigating factor); id. § 15A-
1340.16(d)(18) (aggravating factor).
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dant has a support system in the community.218
Utah law allows the court to consider whether incest offenders
have strong supportive family relationships.219 Tennessee law allows
consideration of whether “[t]he defendant was motivated by a desire
to provide necessities for the defendant’s family or the defendant’s
self.”220 This factor relates primarily to providing economic necessi-
ties.221
If state law permits the sentencer to consider defendant family
impact evidence in noncapital cases, it seems logical, given the law’s
generally heightened protections for capital defendants,222 that the
law should also permit such evidence in capital cases. Moreover, if a
state permits defendant family impact testimony in noncapital cases,
but not in capital cases, it seems possible that the state is violating
due process and the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has
emphatically held that “death is qualitatively different from a sen-
tence of imprisonment, however long,” and that “[d]eath, in its final-
ity, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term
differs from one of only a year or two.”223 Because of this difference,
the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the imposition
of the death penalty requires a kind of super due process beyond
what is required in regular criminal cases.224 These due process pro-
tections extend to the sentencing phase in capital cases.225
Fundamental fairness in sentencing is also protected by the
Eighth Amendment because of the “special need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment.”226 As the
Court explained in Mills v. Maryland:227
The decision to exercise the power of the State to execute a defen-
dant is unlike any other decision citizens and public officials are
called upon to make. Evolving standards of societal decency have
imposed a correspondingly high requirement of reliability on the
                                                                                                                      
218. See id. §15A-1340.16(e)(18); see also State v. Teague, 300 S.E.2d 7, 7 (N.C. App.
1983) (discussing the court’s authority to consider that the defendant had a supportive and
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219. See UTAH CODE. ANN. app. D, form 2 (1995) (listing mitigating circumstances asso-
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220. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(7) (1997).
221. See State v. Bellew, No. 02C01-9510-CC-00324, 1997 WL 81656, at *3 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Feb. 27, 1997).
222. See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
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concurring); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
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225. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
226. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988).
227. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
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determination that death is the appropriate penalty in a particu-
lar case.228
Because the protections available to a capital defendant are more
stringent than those available for a noncapital defendant, any miti-
gation evidence admitted at a noncapital criminal sentencing hear-
ing must logically be admissible in capital sentencing hearings.
V.   POLICY ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE USE OF DEFENDANT
FAMILY IMPACT EVIDENCE
A.   Family Impact Evidence Is Relevant to Traditional Sentencing
Goals
Aside from the apparent constitutional requirements for admit-
ting family impact evidence, there are strong policy arguments fa-
voring the admission of such evidence. Family impact evidence is
relevant to the traditional sentencing goals of rehabilitation and in-
capacitation. Evidence about a defendant’s relationship with his
family is relevant in determining the likelihood of his rehabilitation.
It is also relevant in determining whether and to what extent he
should be isolated from the community. Detailed information about
the defendant’s history and relationship with his family would likely
help the sentencing authority understand which types of punish-
ment would be most effective in rehabilitating the defendant. Infor-
mation about the defendant’s family and support structure would
also inform the sentencer as to what punishment is most likely to de-
ter the defendant from committing future crimes.
Evidence providing the details of a defendant’s life is routinely in-
troduced at the sentencing stage. Courts frequently call family
members to attest to traumatic events in the defendant’s life that
might explain and mitigate the crime and to attest to positive as-
pects of the defendant’s character that might show why his life
should be spared. Similarly, a complete picture of the defendant’s life
requires admission of testimony from his family members about
what has happened to them as a result of their loved one being
charged with a capital crime.
The following are examples of the types of evidence that juries
should have been allowed to consider during the sentencing phase of
particular trials:
Darlie Routier, the wife of Darin Routier, is on death row in Texas
for allegedly killing her two sons. Darin, who was in the house at the
time of the slaying, claims that an intruder entered the home and
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killed his sons while they slept on the living room couch. Darlie was
seriously injured at the time the police arrived at the scene, which is
consistent with Darlie’s statement that she was attacked by an in-
truder and adds credibility to her strong claim of innocence. Prior to
this prosecution, Darlie had never been in trouble with the law and
had been a caring and loving mother. Darlie’s arrest, conviction, and
death sentence have devastated her surviving son and husband. The
jury should have been allowed to hear about the impact of the death
penalty legal process on her family and what her death would mean
to them. Mr. Routier spoke about the impact that the crime and en-
suing judicial process had on him:
I went on antidepressants, just went off of them. I lost 35
pounds. I didn’t eat for eleven days and got sick from that. All in
all, I don’t trust shrinks, I don’t trust counselors, everything you
say to them somebody is going to get their hands on. I’ve talked a
little bit to psychiatrists. It is impossible to grieve this until we
get this resolved. It’s kind of one of these philosophies, we either
live or we die.
Darlie’s biggest fear is to die thinking that people will believe
she did this. I’m not scared for her because I know the truth. I
know that, thank God, we have appeals. We are just going to get
older and grayer. We miss each other a whole lot. The one suffer-
ing the most is Drake; I can’t replace Darlie completely. I can give
him twice as much love but there is no replacement to a mother
for a child. He knows his mommy and he does get to see her. But
it is painful for Darlie to want to hold him and she can’t. You can
only imagine what she is feeling.229
Richard Longwood, son of Barbara Longwood, was sentenced to
death as an accessory in the murder of a movie theater attendant.
Ms. Longwood described the effect the death penalty legal process
has had on her family:
The family almost ceases. I would say only by the grace of God
are we still a family. I had a young child who was only eleven at
the time. You have to maintain some semblance of normalcy for a
young child and my two little grandchildren.
Death would have been so easy. It would have been horrible had
Richard been the one killed, but it would have been over and some
sort of healing would have started. This pain, there is no way to
describe it. I don’t know how to put it into words. The family dies.
We went into hibernation, a stand still. Everything is going on but
it isn’t. Everything shuts down. Everything totally shuts down.
Feelings shut down, everything does. Definitely shock. You just
got to go through the motions, in a zombie like state.
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My marriage is still intact and we are making it work. There
have been a lot of health problems. My husband has suffered a
bout with cancer . . . . I have had to fight depression, we all have.
We’ve all been on anti-depressants from time to time.230
Sonda Donovan’s brother, John Patrick Eastlack was initially
sentenced to death, then was resentenced to life in prison. Ms. Dono-
van recounted some of the experiences of having a family member
accused of a capital crime and what it was like to live with an im-
pending execution.
One thing that happened for me is that people don’t always
know [that I had a brother on death row]. It is not the easiest
thing for me to tell people. If someone is going to be my friend, it
is something they need to know about.
I am not proud of him for what he did. My mom, in particular,
was absolutely devastated, which I understand a little better.231
Parents do anything they can to take care of their kids. She
couldn’t do anything to take care of him. She felt horrible about
what he did. It turned all our lives upside down. My biological fa-
ther, John’s adoptive father, was in denial about the whole thing.
He wasn’t involved at all. Don, my stepfather, was very sad and
mad and confused. He stuck by John the whole time but it im-
pacted him as well.232
Conny Hudgin’s seventeen-year-old son, Joseph, was sentenced to
death for the murder of a police officer in South Carolina. Ms.
Hudgin claims that Joseph was an unwilling accomplice to the crime
and that he falsely confessed to the crime believing that, as a juve-
nile, there would be less serious consequences for him than for his
friend who had shot the officer. Joseph’s friend refused to admit to
the crime and, instead, agreed with the state to testify against Jo-
seph. In return for his testimony, the friend received a prison sen-
tence of thirty years with eligibility for parole in seven years. Joseph
was sentenced to death. His father describes what the experience has
been like for him:
It devastated us, we still are. I never in a trillion years thought
I would have anyone in my family in jail, let alone death row. I’ve
lived in this town all my life. It is unbelievable to us that this
could have ever happened. My life has never been the same. None
of our lives will be. I’ll never rest until he is home. If they ever
should execute Joseph it would probably kill me. I doubt if I could
take that. I’m a pretty strong person. This is one of the worst
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things that has ever happened to me in my life, this thing with
Joseph.
You just have to go through it to really know there isn’t a mo-
ment of the day that I don’t think about Joseph and his case. It’s
there when I wake up in the morning and the last thought before I
go to sleep at night. Every moment I might be thinking of stuff,
but still it enters my mind.
You think about the negative stuff that has been going against
us. It is very devastating. It has impacted my health. I was in in-
tensive coronary last year. I have days when I am more depressed
than others. I don’t have to take medicine for my depression. I like
to be by myself to cope with it. I live for the time when Joseph
calls me or I go to visit him. He insists that I should take vaca-
tions and lead a normal life, but I am not living a normal life.
There is no normalcy here.233
Using defendant family impact evidence at a sentencing hearing
differs in one obvious way from using victim impact evidence. By the
time of the sentencing hearing, the victim’s family has already expe-
rienced the worst of the impact of the crime—the death of their loved
one. The victim’s family can describe what the loss has been like for
them and the impact it has had on them. However, with defendant
family impact evidence, the experience of being involved in a capital
case is just beginning at the point of sentencing. Family members
have to endure the societal stigma of having a family member ac-
cused of a capital crime and can testify about the impact of the crime
on their lives up to that point. However, a court can only speculate
as to the ultimate long-term impact on a defendant’s family of having
a loved one living on death row and losing that loved one to execu-
tion.
Courts routinely admit this type of speculative evidence at sen-
tencing hearings in noncapital cases.234 Defendant family members
may testify about the impact that sending their loved one to jail will
have on the family. In one sense, this impact is necessarily specula-
tive because no one can know what the future holds. Yet, people
make predictions all the time based on past and present experiences.
Judges make sentencing decisions while trying to predict the future
conduct of the defendants based on the past conduct of defendants.
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Sentencing is not an exact science, and speculation is part of the pro-
cess.
Another possible way to use defendant family impact evidence is
by having family members who have experienced an execution to
testify about the impact on their lives. As the use of the death pen-
alty continues to grow in the United States, increasing numbers of
people will experience the loss of family members to executions. They
can provide valuable testimony as to what happens to a family after
an execution or after the imposition of the death penalty.
The following two persons experienced profound impacts on their
lives: Renee Womack-Keels lost her father to an execution when she
was an infant, and Trevor Dicks’ brother was sentenced to death
when he was eleven years old. They describe a bit of their lives in the
following passages.
After her father’s execution, Ms. Womack-Keels went to live with
her grandparents. She describes her grandmother’s grief:
My grandmother drank, my mother I don’t think so. My grand-
mother, I went to live with my grandmother in 1954, I was eight
years old. I went to live with her because my grandmother threat-
ened to take me from my mother legally. I look back and I have
had conversations with my mother about that. She talked about
being young and having a child and thought it was the best thing
to do. It is not unusual in the African-American community for
grandmothers to raise grandchildren. Her second son was missing
in the Korean War, so by the time she was fifty-one years old, she
had no children around.
Similar to my grandmother, none of my children are close to me.
I’m going to write a book about the parallels between my life and
my grandmother’s. Her oldest son dead, her second son an-
nounced missing in action. It was almost like she never had any
children. My father died at age twenty-two. My uncle was born in
’27 and missing in ’51. By the time ’54 rolled around, she had been
living from 1946 to ’51 with all of this pain of the loss of her two
children bottled up inside of her.
I wouldn’t call her an alcoholic but she was one of those closet
women who secretly drank. Emotionally, I believe my grand-
mother was stressed and had days when she was borderline suici-
dal.235
Ms. Womack-Keels explains further about the shame her grand-
mother felt at her inability to save her son’s life and the eerie paral-
lels with her own life. Ms. Womack-Keels’s adult son is now serving a
sentence of life without parole in Massachusetts, a state without the
death penalty.
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She [my grandmother] did talk about being poor and being un-
able to have the resources necessary for a more adequate defense,
I’m giving you the words of someone who has a more sophisticated
language. My grandmother’s language was a language of feeling
like how it felt not to have the money it took to defend her son.
I have a copy of the bill (for her father’s defense) for $800 for the
entire defense, including mileage. How she was not able to talk
about it, not having any of her family members come to her aid,
she said people just did not know how to talk to her or with her.
They stayed away. She talked about being ashamed, just how
painful it was not to be able to do anything, not being able to stop
this, not being able to find the proper resources or the proper lan-
guage to save her son.
The real horror and drama for me in all this is I seem to be re-
living my grandmother’s life. My oldest son is in prison with a life
sentence for murder. I was forty-six when it happened. My
grandmother was forty-six when my father was executed. This
mirroring of my grandmother’s life, for me, this is about breaking
this intergenerational curse.236
Trevor Dicks was eleven years old when his older brother, Jeff,
was sentenced to death. Mr. Dicks describes what happened to him
as a result of that experience:
I was eleven years old when I heard the judge pronounce the
death sentence on my brother by electrocution until he was “dead,
dead, dead.” I learned that the state and the law and authority
figures have the right to take someone and rip them away for no
more reason because of their skin color and lack of wealth. They
no longer care about what is right and wrong. They want a convic-
tion under their belt. The more they get, the better their career is.
At that time, I didn’t know when it would be carried out. I had
an eleven-year-old imagination of electrocution. Those nightmares
have haunted me for nineteen years now. I couldn’t find anyone to
express my feelings to. I was also condemned.
My lifelong friends were told they couldn’t play with me because
I had a brother on death row accused of murder. I can remember
my best friend Travis telling me he wasn’t going to be allowed to
play with me anymore. We snuck over to the bushes to hug and
talk. Losing friends, feeling like an outcast to society. My friends
were not allowed to socialize with me anymore. School was getting
real tough.
I was forced to drop out of school in the fourth grade. I went on
the road to try to raise money to get my brother a new trial. My
mom and my brother’s new daughter, Maria, we traveled for nu-
merous years. My two sisters stayed in North Carolina. One got a
job; the other stayed with my father who was a full-blown alco-
holic by now. My parents separated and my sister went to New
York with my dad and I went with my mom.
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The years started rolling by. I was always looked at as an out-
sider. My self-esteem dropped. My anger started growing. The
fear that they could take away any person that I loved at any time
increased. I feared my mother would be taken to the electric chair.
I had no belief in anything, the churches, God. I felt we were out-
casts from God. It crushed all my self-esteem and faith. I was lost
for a good many years.237
B.   The Need to Balance the Bias from Victim Impact Evidence
The decision to permit victim impact evidence is a difficult one
fraught with many conflicting societal interests. We believe that the
current use of victim impact evidence in capital cases has tipped an
already precariously unfair system to an unacceptable level of preju-
dice against capital defendants. States should not follow the Payne
decision; states should prohibit the introduction of victim impact
evidence in capital cases. However, in today’s political climate,
turning back the clock to the days before victim impact evidence is
unlikely. The victim’s rights movement has enjoyed increased popu-
larity, and this popularity has come at the expense of the rights of
criminal defendants. As Ellen Yaroshefsky noted:
Although some may claim that the victim’s rights movement is
not anti-defendant, many of the reforms, in fact, have had a nega-
tive impact upon the rights of the defendant. Most particularly,
laws regarding pretrial release have had a negative impact upon
defendants. Experience with victim impact statements demon-
strates the same. Significantly, those in the forefront of the vic-
tim’s rights movement believe in greater restrictions upon defen-
dants, more prisons, and greater punishment as the method of
crime control.
One cannot ignore that, concomitant with the advances in vic-
tim’s rights, there has been a judicial retreat in the rights of de-
fendants. This retreat includes the decreasing protection provided
by the law of search and seizure, limitations on appellate review
of convictions, and harsher sentencing standards. This resulted,
in part, from the inaccurate perception that criminology and the
courts have emphasized the rights of defendants to the detriment
of victims. To the extent that there ever was strong support for
the rights of defendants, the pendulum has swung too far against
defendant’s rights, and unfortunately, it is the victims who are, in
large part, on the other side of that pendulum.238
Since 1976 courts have ostensibly attempted to make the process
more equitable in practice. In spite of the courts’ attempts, some data
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indicates that capital jurors are still swayed by impermissible factors
such as the race of the victim, the defendant, or both.239 Allowing
one-sided victim impact evidence into the penalty phase of a capital
trial promotes jury reliance on subjective factors.240 A victim’s testi-
mony as to the harm caused by the crime has the potential to inflame
the jury and to be unduly prejudicial.241
To counter-balance this prejudice, we suggest that the definition
of victim impact be expanded to include the family of the defendant.
The family members of those facing death at the hands of the state
are as “innocent” as the family members of those who were mur-
dered. Fairness requires that a capital jury hearing of the decedent’s
family impact should also hear from the defendant’s family.
C.   Victim Family Members Support Participation of Defendant
Family Members at Sentencing
Concurrent with the research on death row family members, co-
author Rachel King has been interviewing family members of mur-
der victims. Most of these participants are members of an organiza-
tion called Murder Victims Family Members for Reconciliation
(MVFR).242 MVFR is a national organization of family members who
have lost relatives to murder or execution by the state. MVFR op-
poses the death penalty in all cases and works for alternatives to the
death penalty. MVFR promotes policies to prevent violent crime and
programs that help victims heal and rebuild their lives. As one of
their publications states: “We know too well the horrible effects of
killing, and how important it is that the cycle of killing in this coun-
try be broken. We can’t stop all violence, but we can work to stop the
violence carried out by a government that kills in our names.”243
One question asked of the participants was whether the victims’
family members should be part of the decision to seek the death pen-
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243. MURDER VICTIMS FAMILIES FOR RECONCILIATION, NOT IN OUR NAME: MURDER
VICTIMS FAMILIES SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2d ed. 1998).
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alty, and if so, whether they should have input into whether the
death penalty is imposed. The next question asked was whether the
defendant’s family should have similar input. Significantly, victims’
family members surveyed were consistent in their answers to these
questions. If they favored murder victim participation, they also be-
lieved the defendant’s family should participate. Conversely, if they
did not favor victim family participation, they did not support defen-
dant family participation. The participants believed that if one fam-
ily was allowed input into the sentencing decision, the other family
should also be allowed.
Here is a selected sampling of the answers given to the questions,
“Should victim family members be involved and should defendant
family members be involved in death penalty sentencing hearings?”
Celeste Dixon on involving victims’ family members:
If you talk to a person after they have had someone murdered,
they are not in a position to make a decision as important as
whether or not somebody should die. There are a few people who
might be able to say, “No, this person shouldn’t die.” Most of us, if
you asked us right after they caught the person, certainly almost
every person would probably say “yes.” Eventually, if you work
through the natural process of grieving and get over the anger,
you might later change your mind. I don’t think family members
should be able to make that decision in the beginning. Even with-
out the expectation from the prosecutor’s office, our natural re-
sponse is revenge.244
Celeste Dixon on involving defendants’ family members:
I don’t know. I’m sure that they would probably be inclined to
say, “Don’t kill him.” If you are talking about the decision of
whether or not to impose capital punishment they should have in-
put into talking about what kind of person that particular person
is. Part of the problem with our justice system is that we are too
focused on punishing people and not looking at the causes of
crime. I think if they really wanted to be fair they would try to
take everything into consideration about this person before they
try to make the decision about how this person should be pun-
ished.245
Phil Callen on involving murder victims’ family and defendants’
family:
I don’t know that we should. Everyone would agree that, clearly,
the family’s loss is much greater than society as a whole. How-
                                                                                                                      
244. Interview with Celeste Dixon (Dec. 18, 1997) (interview notes on file with Rachel
King). Ms. Dixon’s mother, Marguerite Dixon, was brutally raped and murdered in her
home in Hockley, Texas, on August 18, 1986.
245. Id.
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ever, I don’t think we should place the family’s loss above society’s
loss, especially if we are going to argue that the death penalty is
an appropriate form of punishment or a deterrent. In other words,
if the family’s wishes are to be taken into consideration whether
to seek the death penalty, we should acknowledge the only reason
why we are seeking the death penalty is for revenge.
I guess if we are going to argue that we should involve the mur-
der victim’s family on the one hand, we certainly should do it on
the other hand for the one who is going to be killed.246
Kristi Smith on involving victims’ family members:
Well, I think they should be. I think they might find out that
more people are against it than they realize. I think that I hon-
estly believe that most people, if they are a part of that decision-
making process would say, “No, don’t execute them,” because they
don’t want that on their shoulders. I wouldn’t want to be a part of
anything that would cause a person to lose their life. I think how
they feel about it is important, although that just opens it up for
people who do believe in the death penalty to speak their minds,
too.247
Kristi Smith on participation by defendants’ family members:
I’m not sure about families of defendants. The reason I say that
is because very recently I have seen situations where the family of
the offender is in denial about what the person has done. I’m not
sure they can, although I feel like they have the right to speak. If
families of victims are going to have the right to speak, I think
they (families of defendants) should be able to, also.248
Aba Gayle on participation of victims’ family members:
I think that victims should not have any part in the criminal
justice system whatsoever. When they are in that place they are
not of sound mind. Things you say and do you may regret later on.
The justice system should be regulated by the rules and the laws
and not on people’s emotions. We all want a more just society. I
don’t think that putting up slobbering crying people saying things
like, “My son is never coming home again,” is a way to run a sys-
tem.249
Catherine Emerson on participation by victims’ family members
                                                                                                                      
246. Interview with Phil Callen (Dec. 11, 1997) (interview notes on file with Rachel
King). Mr. Callen’s grandmother, Leona Callen, was murdered in her Cayahooga Falls,
Ohio, home in 1993.
247. Interview with Kristi Smith (Dec. 8, 1997) (interview notes on file with Rachel
King). Kristi Smith’s father, James K. Edwards, was killed behind a grocery store in Wich-
ita, Kansas, when he intervened to assist an older gentleman who was being robbed.
248. Id.
249. Interview with Aba Gayle (Sept. 29, 1997) (interview notes on file with Rachel
King). Ms. Gayle’s daughter, Catherine, was murdered in her home by an acquaintance on
September 29, 1980.
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and defendants’ family members:
Well, you know, I think they (victims’ family members) should
be listened to, but basically it is a crime against society and not
just an individual. But I think the defendant’s family should be
listened to, also. If there are extenuating circumstances I say,
“Yeah, go for it.”250
Carol Drieling on participation by victims’ family members:
I [think] victim impact statements are really important. I think
victims’ family members should have input at the sentencing, too.
Emotionally, the D.A. could use the statements to get the death
penalty. I have seen it locally where they have used the victim’s
pain to get the death penalty, and I think it is really manipulat-
ive. Sometimes you are not in a place where you can talk about it
because you are so numb. How devastating murder can be on the
family. You lose work; you need to restructure the family. We are
going to feel the effects for generations; we have ten nieces and
nephews who will never know their grandparents.251
Carol Drieling, when asked if defendants’ family members should
be allowed to participate, responded, “I don’t know about that. Some
families, yes.”252
Some victim family members opposed participation by the victim
family members on the grounds that it sets up differential treatment
between the victims. Those who support the death penalty are
treated better than those who oppose it. For example, some victims
are not allowed to testify against the death penalty. One interview
subject, Marie Deans, referred to a homicide survivor who wanted to
testify against the death penalty at sentencing.253 The survivor was
threatened with a contempt citation by the judge if she mentioned
her opposition to the death penalty.254 In Robinson v. Maynard,255 the
defendant unsuccessfully sought permission to introduce evidence
that the victim was opposed to the death penalty, but the trial court
and each successive appellate court reviewing the decision upheld
the decision.256 Victim impact evidence, clearly a sword in the hands
                                                                                                                      
250. Interview with Catherine Emerson (Dec. 2, 1997) (interview notes on file with Ra-
chel King). Ms. Emerson’s niece was murdered in the desert outside of Tucson, Arizona.
251. Interview with Carol Drieling (Dec. 4, 1997) (interview notes on file with Rachel
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252. Id.
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King).
254. See id.
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256. See id. at 1504.
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of the prosecutor, is not allowed to be a shield in the hands of the de-
fense.257
Marie Deans articulated this concern:
The reason victim family members should not be involved is be-
cause of Suezanne Bozler.258 It becomes this issue of the good vic-
tim/bad victim. If we are for the death penalty, that’s great. If we
oppose the death penalty, they threaten to throw you in prison.
I worked very early on in the ’70s, 1971-1979, with a victim’s
family involved in a capital case. I went to visit them. They had
agreed with the death penalty and they told me that the prosecu-
tor had told them that if they didn’t agree with the death penalty
the guy was going to come out of jail in three years and murder
them.
They said the death penalty was against their faith. They asked
me to call the prosecutor for them. I called the prosecutor and be-
fore I could tell him what I wanted, he said, “It is wonderful you
can be a liaison for them.” I finally said, “You’re making an incor-
rect assumption. They are asking me to tell you that they do not
want the death penalty.” The prosecutor then said, “This crime is
not against them, it was against society.”
So prosecutors exclude victims if they feel like we do. They urge
them if they don’t. I think the fact that victims’ family members
can be allowed is why prosecutors work them so. The last thing a
victim’s family needs is to be worked politically.259
VI.   A CASE IN POINT—HOW DEFENDANT FAMILY IMPACT EVIDENCE
MAY HAVE SAVED THE LIFE OF A TEXAS MAN
Dave Herman was executed in Huntsville, Texas on April 2,
1997.260 Dave was thirty-nine years old at the time of the execu-
tion.261 He had been a beloved member of his community. He was
married and had a young daughter. He had just completed the li-
censing process to become a stockbroker, and he had never had any
problems with the law.262 The following is his mother, Ester Her-
man’s, description of the crime:
                                                                                                                      
257. See Megan M. Wallace, The Ethical Considerations of Defense Strategies When
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bor, Penny Deans, was murdered in her home by an intruder in 1972.
260. See Interview with Ester Herman (Dec. 16, 1997) (interview notes on file with Ra-
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261. See id.
262. See id.
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He was totally broke, and his mother-in-law had come here from
Idaho for the holiday, and there was a promise that his wife and
daughter would be going back to Idaho with her.
He robbed a bar which he had managed several years before.
They owed him money. He shot three people, one died. It was hor-
rible. He had tied people up and secured them with coat hangers.
It was as bad as a drive-by shooting. Any kind of murder is horri-
ble.
It was a total shock to the entire community. It was out of per-
sonality context for Dave who was a high-spirited, sweet person.
Nobody could imagine that he perpetrated this crime, no one.
I thankfully did not experience any of the community ostracism
or anything like that. I am in a very public business, a nail salon.
Most of my clients knew Dave from there. I wasn’t thrown out of
church. I wasn’t dropped from people’s lives. It was very much of a
rally for Dave. Friends of Dave’s did not walk away. He was a very
good person . . . .263
Ms. Herman believes that her son was influenced by personal
problems to act in a way that was terribly out of character.264 She ex-
plained that her son was very worried about money and had been
trying unsuccessfully to build a business. Ms. Herman believes that
Dave did not want to burden her with his problems, as she was busy
taking care of her parents and brother. Her mother was a diabetic
and had a broken hip, and her brother was dying of cancer.265 Ms.
Herman states:
Every weekend Dave brought his little girl (to visit his grand-
parents). He was the grandchild that offered assistance to mother
and dad. He was real good friends to Uncle Bob who was confined
to a wheelchair. Dave was overloaded. He chose not to come to me
with his problems. I’d say, “How’re you doing?” and he’d say,
“Fine” and give me a hug.
I really encouraged him to get out of the bar management.
Those elements don’t impress me whatsoever. He went to stock-
broker school. He was a very brilliant person and got his license
about four months before the crash. He just simply could not earn
a living for his family. He was very determined, not lazy. He was
artistically talented.266
Of course, these are the musings of a mother about her son. How-
ever, Ms. Herman was not at all apologetic about her son’s crime.267
She believed that he should have received a life sentence, but she
opposed the death penalty. She believed that her son had much he
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could still contribute, even while in jail.268 Again, Ms. Herman’s
words:
He did an enormous amount of good in prison. I would be glad to
talk to you about letters I have received from other inmates as to
the kind of strength that Dave had for other people there. The day
he died, we were given preferential treatment because of his con-
duct as an inmate. Some of the guards cried.269
Dave was very remorseful about his crime.270 He desperately
wanted the forgiveness of the victim’s family. Ms. Herman recounts
an event that occurred right before Dave’s execution:
In the hotel room the afternoon of Dave’s execution, after we
had seen him for the last time, the victim’s sister found us and
came up to me and hugged me several times, and she repeatedly
told me how sorry she was. Our minister was Dave’s spiritual ad-
visor. I asked him to please go back to Dave and let him know. He
wanted desperately to know that there was some forgiveness in
the family. Our minister said that Dave cried and laughed at the
same time and said, “Thank God!”271
The jury that sentenced Dave to death did not hear any of this
evidence.272 His mother testified at the sentencing hearing, but was
limited to talking about his childhood, his home life, and his rela-
tionship with his father. She did not testify about the impact that
Dave’s crime, incarceration, and possible death sentence had, and
would have, on her and the community. She was not questioned
about these things, probably because it is not a traditional area of
inquiry in death sentencing hearings.273
Under the Stevens decision, family members would have been
permitted to testify about the impact of Dave’s execution on their
lives.274 His grandparents and uncle could have testified about the
importance of his support for them. His mother could have testified
about how helpful he was as a son. His sister could have testified
about the depression she had experienced since the arrest and the
stress of having a brother charged with a capital crime. His father, a
retired Marine Corps officer, could also have testified about how dif-
ficult it would be for him if his son were to be executed. Had the
Texas jury heard such evidence, perhaps they would have spared his
life.
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The Oregon death penalty statute is similar to the Texas statute.
Under Stevens, the definition of “character” includes how the defen-
dant impacted the people in his life.275 The Stevens court interpreted
character as meaning the following:
[A] rational juror could infer that there are positive aspects about
[the] defendant’s relationship with his daughter that demonstrate
that [the] defendant has the capacity to be of emotional value to
others. In that inference, a juror could find an aspect of [the] de-
fendant’s character or background that could justify a sentence of
less than death.276
Dave Herman had such support from his community, from his fam-
ily, and from the jailers that supervised him.277 Applying the Stevens
court’s interpretation of “character,” Dave’s jury could have inferred
that he had a special character that was not in keeping with the im-
age of a depraved, hateful person who deserves the death penalty.
Such evidence could have made the difference between death and life
for Dave Herman.
VII.   KEEPING THE STATUS QUO OR SOMETHING DIFFERENT: CAN
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE BE APPLIED IN DEATH PENALTY CASES?
From a psychological standpoint, we believe that having the de-
fendant families participate in the sentencing process will encourage
reconciliation between the victims and the defendants. Reconcilia-
tion between the two families might lead to reconciliation between
the defendant and the victim’s family, restoring a sense of peace and
balance to the community. Many victims’ family members have re-
ported the experience of initially supporting the death penalty and
then later changing their mind.278 Often, this change of heart came
from having contact with the defendant or someone in his family. A
person will have difficulty dehumanizing a defendant and wanting
him to die if the person has seen the pain in the defendant’s mother’s
eyes or the desperation of the defendant’s children. Ultimately, rec-
onciliation leads to healing, which can be the greatest source of com-
fort for the murder victim’s family.279
Many victims’ family members interviewed reported that their
perspective on the death penalty, the crime, and the system changed
as a result of having contact with the defendant’s family members.
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Many defendants’ family members expressed the desire to speak
with and offer condolences to the victim’s family, but were usually
advised by their attorneys not to have any contact. Victims’ family
members report feeling confused and angry that the defendant never
apologized, without knowing that defendants are advised by their at-
torneys not to have any contact because of the possibility that they
may say something that would jeopardize their legal position.
We believe that bringing the family members together at the sen-
tencing phase may promote reconciliation.280 There has been a
movement during the past twenty years, both within the United
States and around the world, to bring the idea of restorative justice
to the criminal justice system.281 One such program is the Victim Of-
fender Reconciliation Program (VORP). This program originated in
Canada and was brought to the United States through a joint effort
of Prisoners and Community Together (PACT) and the Mennonite
Church.282 The VORP program combines conflict resolution and res-
titution.283 It brings together victims and offenders, offering a rare
opportunity for victims to receive from offenders the answers to nag-
ging questions, helping them to better understand the victim experi-
ence.284
In short, the traumatic experience of being a victim can be proc-
essed more fully. Fears and anxieties can be dealt with. Stereo-
types about offenders may be laid to rest, resulting not only in
greater understanding of the offender but also reduced anxiety
and suspicion for the victim. In place of the feelings of powerless-
ness and vulnerability which are often part of the victim experi-
ence, victims are empowered to participate in the solution to this
offense. Most importantly, the experience can be brought to clo-
sure rather than left to fester.285
The sense of closure is not a one-way process. Some crime victim
needs are best met through direct contact with offenders.286 When
confronted by the victim, the offender sees that person’s humanity
and has a chance to ask for forgiveness, which may help provide clo-
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sure for the offender.287 According to Robert Black, “‘Self-reform pre-
supposes self-forgiveness,’ . . . but self-forgiveness comes more
swiftly and certainly after forgiveness by the victim.”288 Thus contact
between the victim and offender and their families may encourage
closure.
Interwoven throughout this Article are a number of contradictory
themes that draw attention to the authors’ ambivalence about this
subject. We started with the assumption that the use of victim im-
pact evidence has been a negative development in capital litigation.
As a former defense attorney, coauthor Rachel King is inclined to
oppose the erosion of the adversarial process and the protections it,
at least ostensibly, provides criminal defendants. To a certain extent,
Ms. King believes that the best response to the trend of increasing
victim participation in capital cases is to go back to the “good old
days” and eliminate the use of victim impact evidence from the sen-
tencing phase of capital trials. Realistically, however, this response
is unlikely to happen given the current state of criminal jurispru-
dence.
On the other side of the coin, there may be advantages to opening
the sentencing process even more. There are some advantages to
permitting the use of victim impact evidence, and there could be ad-
vantages to allowing defendants’ families a similar forum. Allowing
victims’ family members to make impact statements accomplishes
many important goals. It affirms for the victims that “the system”
cares about what happened to them and wants to hear from them,
and it can provide victims with a chance to tell their story, which of-
ten brings healing and a sense of regaining control of their lives.
These policy considerations are very important.289 Further, the “good
old days” were never really that good, at least not in the context of
capital litigation. We have never had a system of justice in this coun-
try that is fair to capital defendants or victims. Perhaps it is time to
try something different.
By suggesting that we open the capital sentencing process even
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further, to include the defendant’s family members, we are taking
this healing to another level. Just as the victims’ family members
have suffered tremendously, so have the defendant’s family mem-
bers. Allowing both sides to tell their stories may promote reconcilia-
tion between the parties. It may heal the “us and them” attitude that
is fueling the war on crime. It may help us all to see that criminal
defendants, in spite of the mistakes they have made, are human be-
ings with families and people who love them. It may help us to rec-
ognize that defendants deserve to be treated with respect and dig-
nity, regardless of how horrible their behavior.
One alternative that would address the concern about opening the
sentencing process to such subjective testimony is to have a separate
public allocution hearing that takes place apart from the formal sen-
tencing process. Both victims’ families and defendants’ families could
speak about their experiences to the jury, judge, attorneys, and spec-
tators, but the forum would be outside the traditional court format.
Any comments victims’ or defendants’ family members made would
not influence the decision maker. A separate forum would encourage
the therapeutic process of talking about one’s own experience, but it
would take it outside of the formal legal context and eliminate the
risk of passion and prejudice contributing to an increased imposition
of the death penalty.
There is precedent for this type of process from other countries.
Traditional Native Canadian practices have used “sentencing cir-
cles.” Everyone involved in a case sits in a circle and has a chance to
voice their feelings about the crime. Sentencing circles give these in-
dividuals an opportunity to express their opinion on how best to ad-
dress the needs of the victim and to help reintegrate the offender
into the community.290 A similar practice exists in New Zealand with
“Family Group Conferences,” where victims and their supporters, of-
fenders and their families, and representatives of the police and the
legal system, gather together to decide by consensus the best out-
come.291
This practice obviously seeks a much different goal than the deci-
sion of whether to put someone to death. But the real issue we as a
society need to resolve is whether the death penalty is working. Does
it deter violent crime? Is the criminal justice system fair? Is it help-
ing miscreants to better adapt themselves into life within the larger
community? How much money are we as a society willing to spend to
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continue locking up and executing greater numbers of our citizens?292
Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this Article. We do
not pretend to have these answers; nonetheless, we hope that the
reader will join us in wrestling with the questions.
VIII.   CONCLUSION
In spite of the United States Supreme Court’s attempt to articu-
late a set of guiding principles to ensure fairness in death penalty
cases, the data shows that juries continue to be swayed by impermis-
sible, subjective factors—most notably the victim’s race.293 This data
and the fact that forty percent of prisoners on death row are black,294
gives us pause to consider just how effective the judicial system has
been at overseeing the death system in the United States. However,
given the current political climate, the death penalty is a reality in
American jurisprudence and will be for some time. The current
criminal justice system is also not likely to experience any major re-
forms immediately.
Given that reality, every possible procedure should be imple-
mented to ensure fairness for the criminal defendant and respect for
the victim’s and defendant’s family members. Supreme Court prece-
dent requires broad acceptance of mitigating evidence in capital
cases and also allows the admission of victim impact statements. At
least one state supreme court has held that admission of defendant
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family impact evidence is statutorily required in capital cases.295 In
noncapital cases, many states permit introduction of defendant fam-
ily evidence at sentencing. Even some victims’ family members sup-
port allowing defendant families to take a more active part in the
sentencing process.296 Permitting this type of testimony is only fair.
If we must have a death penalty and if a murder victim’s family
members are allowed to be heard, then so should family members of
the defendants.
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APPENDIX
QUESTIONS FOR THE DEATH ROW PROJECT
1. Who is your family member who was sentenced to death?
2. What was your relationship with that person like when they
went to death row?
3. When and where did the murder occur?
4. What were the circumstances under which the murder oc-
curred?
5. Were you involved in the trial or sentencing phase?
6. If yes, how?
 —Did you testify as a witness?
 —Write a letter to the judge?
 —Speak with the prosecutor?
 —Speak with the defense attorney?
7. If you weren’t involved, why not?
8. Was the experience of being part of the criminal justice sys-
tem positive, negative, or neutral?
 —How did this process affect your family?
 —How were you treated by the police and prosecutors?
 —How were you treated by the court system?
 —How were you treated by defense counsel?
 —Do you have recommendations to people in the justice
system for improving the process?
 —Did you or another family member experience any
health problems resulting from the stress surrounding
this experience?
9. Did your family member receive adequate legal representa-
tion in your opinion?
10. Were you referred to or approached by any support groups af-
ter the murder or any point in the process?
11. Did you seek any outside assistance or support during or af-
ter the trial?
 —What services or support were provided?
 —Was it helpful? What was most helpful?
 —What was least helpful?
 —What, if any, discussions did they have with you about
the death penalty?
12. Have you visited your family member on death row and/or
continued to maintain your relationship in another way?
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13. If you have not, why?
14. Have you experienced any ostracism from friends, family or
acquaintances as a result of the death sentence?
15. Did the conviction affect your ability to continue prior activi-
ties such as work, community involvement, family roles?
 —What about for other family members?
16. What effects, if any, did the conviction and sentence have on
relationships between family members? (family dynamics)
17. Do you support the death penalty?  If yes, why? If no, why?
18. Was your position on the death penalty changed as a result of
this experience?
19. Was your loved one executed? If your loved one is still alive
and involved in the appeal process, what are you doing to
prepare yourself for the possibility of his/her execution?
20. If your loved one has been executed, do you think it is possi-
ble to heal from these wounds? Have you been able to heal?
What recommendations would you make to others in your
situation?
21. Has there been a reconciliation between the offender and the
victim’s family? If not, is this reconciliation possible or likely?
22. Have you forgiven the offender?
—The state?
—Is there anyone you are unable to forgive?
23. Should family members of victims be part of the process to
decide whether to seek the death penalty or part of the death
penalty sentence hearing? How do you believe you should be
involved in this process?
